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Heritage, Power, and Destiny: 
The Protection of Indigenous Heritage 




“Won’t you help to sing 
These songs of freedom? . . . 
None but ourselves can free our minds.”1  
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the clash between investors’ rights 
and Indigenous peoples’ rights in international investment 
law and arbitration.  It contributes to the existing literature 
by highlighting the power differentials among different state 
and non-state actors as well as the role of international 
investment law in maximizing or neutralizing such conflicts.  
The existing literature has shown that the protection of the 
rights of Indigenous peoples has increasingly intersected 
with the promotion of foreign investments in international 
investment law.  However, due to the extraordinary boom of 
investor–state arbitrations in the past years, a 
comprehensive scrutiny of the relevant arbitrations and a 
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 1.  Bob Marley, Redemption Song, UPRISING (Island Records 1980). 
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conceptual analysis of the same is still missing.  This Article 
aims to fill this gap in the existing literature.  Not only does 
this Article map the most recent awards dealing with 
Indigenous peoples’ rights, but it also critically assesses the 
key importance of this jurisprudence for the development of 
international investment law, human rights law, and 
international law more generally.  
INTRODUCTION 
Although the protection of Indigenous rights has gained 
some momentum since the adoption of the 2007 United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP or Declaration), 2  “many of the estimated 370 
million [I]ndigenous peoples around the world have lost, or 
are under imminent threat of losing, their ancestral lands” 
because of the exploitation of natural resources.3  In fact, “a 
large proportion of the world’s remaining natural resources . 
. . are located on [I]ndigenous-occupied lands . . . . [and] 
global demand for natural resources has skyrocketed in 
recent years.”4  Economic considerations risk perpetuating 
power asymmetries among investors, states, and Indigenous 
peoples.5 
This Article explores the clash between investors’ rights 
and Indigenous peoples’ rights in international investment 
law and arbitration.  It contributes to the existing literature 
by highlighting the power differentials among different state 
and non-state actors as well as the role of international 
                                                 
 2.  U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples].  The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) was approved by 143 nations.  While the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia initially opposed the Declaration, they all subsequently 
endorsed the Declaration. 
 3.  Navi Pillay, Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Navi Pillay for 9 August, the International Day of the World’s 
Indigenous People, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/int_day_2011_message_UNHC
HR.pdf (last visited June 14, 2018). 
 4.  The Double Life of International Law: Indigenous Peoples and 
Extractive Industries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1756 (2016) [hereinafter The 
Double Life of International Law]. 
 5.  George K. Foster, Investors, States, and Stakeholders: Power 
Asymmetries in International Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of 
Investment Treaties’, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361, 361–62 (2013) [hereinafter 
Foster, Investors, States, and Stakeholders]. 
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investment law in maximizing or neutralizing such conflicts.  
The existing literature has shown that the protection of the 
rights of Indigenous peoples has increasingly intersected 
with the promotion of foreign investments in international 
investment law.6  However, due to the extraordinary boom 
of investor–state arbitrations in the past years, a 
comprehensive scrutiny of the relevant arbitrations and a 
conceptual analysis of the same is still missing.  This Article 
aims to fill this gap in the existing literature.  Not only does 
this Article map the most recent awards dealing with 
Indigenous peoples’ rights, but it also critically assesses the 
key importance of this jurisprudence for the development of 
international investment law, human rights law, and 
international law more generally.  
There is tension between state obligations to investors 
arising under investment treaty provisions and state policies 
adopted to protect the rights of Indigenous peoples.  Arbitral 
tribunals can deem regulations to be indirect expropriation 
for interfering with foreign investment; regulatory changes 
can be challenged as violations of the fair and equitable 
treatment that states owe to investors.  Indigenous protests 
against certain investments have led to claims of violation of 
the full protection and security standard under applicable 
international investment agreements (IIAs).7  In fact, under 
most IIAs, investors can challenge state regulation alleged to 
infringe their rights before international arbitral tribunals.8  
                                                 
 6. For a seminal study see Valentina Vadi, When Cultures Collide: 
Foreign Direct Investment, Natural Resources and Indigenous Heritage in 
International Investment Law, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 797–889 (2011) 
[hereinafter Vadi, When Cultures Collide].  See also VALENTINA VADI, 
CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 
204–36 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) [hereinafter VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE]; 
George K. Foster, Foreign Investment and Indigenous Peoples: Options for 
Promoting Equilibrium Between Economic Development and Indigenous Rights, 
33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 627 (2012).  
 7.  Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 26, 53 (June 2, 2010) (the claimant sought, 
inter alia, to hold Ecuador liable for failing to provide physical protection and 
security for the company’s hydrocarbon concession in blocks twenty-three and 
twenty-four of the Amazonian rain forests, arguing that the opposition of 
Indigenous communities to oil development had impeded its business and that 
Ecuador’s purported failure to provide physical security violated the standard of 
full protection and security under the U.S.–Ecuador BIT.). 
 8.  August Reinisch, The Scope of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in 
International Investment Agreements, 21 ASIA PACIFIC L. REV. 3, 8 (2013) (noting 
that “IIA dispute settlement clauses typically contain a graduated procedure 
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This mechanism has sensibly altered “investor–state power 
dynamics” and brought the existing “power asymmetry” 
between Indigenous peoples, investors, and states to the 
forefront of legal debate.9 
IIAs aim to address “the inherent power asymmetry in 
favor of host states resulting from their sovereign status.”10  
Historically, foreign investors have been amongst the 
vulnerable sectors of societies—easy objects of reprisal, 
without vote and voice in the local political affairs. 11  
Fundamentally, “[i]nvestment treaties aim at establishing a 
level playing field for foreign investors and a sort of shield 
against their discrimination and mistreatment by the host 
state.”12  Foreign investors no longer have to rely on the 
vagaries of diplomatic protection;13 rather, they can bring 
direct claims and make strategic choices in the conduct of the 
proceedings. 14   In this regard, investor–state arbitration 
facilitates access to justice for foreign investors 15  , and 
provides a neutral international forum for the settlement of 
investment disputes.16   It is perceived to be necessary to 
render meaningful the more substantive investment treaty 
provisions.17 
                                                 
according to which the parties proceed from voluntary consultations/negotiations 
to binding arbitration.”). 
 9.  Foster, Investors, States, and Stakeholders, supra note 5, at 367–68. 
 10.  Id. at 371 (noting that “[f]oreign investors have long had various 
protections under international law designed to shield them from abusive treatment 
at the hands of the host state, but often had no effective means of enforcing host 
state obligations before the advent of investment treaties.”). 
 11.  See Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and 
International Investment Law, 20 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 729 (2009) [hereinafter 
Francioni, Access to Justice]; JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).  
 12.  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 6, at 291.  
 13.  Sergio Puig, No Right Without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor–
State Arbitration, 35 U. OF PA. J. INT’L L. 829, 844 (2014) [hereinafter Puig, No 
Right without a Remedy].  
 14.  Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a 
Goal-Based Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. J.  465, 485 (2013). 
 15.  See generally Francioni, Access to Justice, supra note 11, at 729–47 
(noting that investor–state arbitration facilitates access to justice for foreign 
investors 
who have direct access to an international tribunal without having to rely on their 
home governments). 
 16.  Puig, No Right Without a Remedy, supra note 13, at 845–46. 
 17.  See Thomas Wälde, The “Umbrella” (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta 
sunt Servanda) Clause in Investment Arbitration, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 4, 
13 (2004).  
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Yet, with regard to investments taking place in areas 
traditionally inhabited by Indigenous peoples, investor–state 
arbitrations have determined other power asymmetries.  One 
such asymmetry is between the foreign investors who have 
access to a binding, effective, and efficient dispute settlement 
mechanism and Indigenous peoples who do not have 
comparable access.  Investor–state arbitrations have also 
perpetuated power asymmetries between Indigenous peoples 
and the host state.  In fact, as noted by human rights bodies, 
“in many cases, States and their officials have favored 
corporate interests to the detriment of Indigenous peoples’ 
interests, stating that [the exploitation of natural resources] 
is in the national and public interest.”18 
Has international investment law embraced an 
international economic culture—a culture focused on 
productivity and economic development—maximizing 
existing power imbalances between investors, states, and 
Indigenous peoples?  Or is international investment law open 
to including human rights concerns in its operation? 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I examines the 
international norms protecting Indigenous cultural heritage 
with particular reference to the UNDRIP.  Part II briefly 
sketches out the international investment law regime.  Part 
III analyzes and critically assesses the relevant arbitrations.  
Part IV offers some legal options to better reconcile the 
different interests at stake.  The last Part briefly concludes.  
The Article argues that the UNDRIP contributes 
significantly to current discourse on Indigenous heritage and 
Indigenous peoples’ human rights.  However, the collision 
between investors’ rights and Indigenous entitlements in 
investor–state arbitration makes the case for strengthening 
the current regime protecting the human rights of Indigenous 
peoples.  In parallel, such interplay also requires further 
reflection on the role of international investment law as a 
vital field of international law and requires scrutiny of its 
congruence with, and contribution to, the development of 
international law.  
The Article then proposes two principal mechanisms to 
                                                 
 18.  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
Study on Indigenous Peoples and Corporations to Examine Existing Mechanisms 
and Policies Related to Corporations and Indigenous Peoples and to Identify Good 
Practices, UN Doc E/C.19/2011/12, ¶10 (Mar. 10, 2011).  
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address the existing power imbalances among Indigenous 
peoples, investors, and states: treaty drafting and treaty 
interpretation.  While these techniques are more evolutionary 
than revolutionary, they offer sound, feasible, and concrete 
steps to prevent conflicts between different treaty regimes.  
While fostering a balance of power, they can contribute to 
the humanization of international investment law and the 
harmonious development of international law.  
I.  THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS 
HERITAGE 
Historically, Indigenous peoples “must be viewed as part 
of the large number of overseas peoples with whom 
European powers entertained diplomatic, commercial and 
political relations during the era of their expansion abroad.”19  
State governments concluded international treaties with 
Indigenous peoples.20  As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, 
“[b]efore the coming of Europeans, the tribes were self-
governing sovereign political communities.”21 
Nonetheless, for centuries, Indigenous peoples were 
“trapped by history” within the mantle of state sovereignty.22  
A “paradigm of domestication” gradually prevailed “through 
which states aimed to subvert the position of Indigenous 
peoples as peoples, often ignoring or unilaterally amending 
treaties” between Indigenous and state parties. 23   The 
concept that only states are subjects of international law 
deeply affected Indigenous peoples.  Prior to the 1970s, 
international law did not view Indigenous peoples as legal 
                                                 
 19.  Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, Reassessing the Paradigm of 
Domestication: The Problematic of Indigenous Treaties, REVUE D’ETUDES 
CONSTITUTIONELLES (1998) 239, 243 [hereinafter Schulte-Tenckhoff, 
Reassessing the Paradigm of Domestication]. 
 20.  Id. (noting that “state governments took Indigenous peoples 
seriously enough to conclude international compacts with them.”) 
 21.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–323 (1978). 
 22.  See Darryl Cronin, Trapped by History: Democracy, Human Rights 
and Justice for Indigenous People in Australia, 23 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 220, 220–
41 (2017). 
 23.  Schulte-Tenckhoff, Reassessing the Paradigm of Domestication, 
supra note 19, at 240. 
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subjects;24 rather, it largely forgot them.25  As a result, states 
tended to view and govern Indigenous peoples as units of 
domestic law.26  As Daes puts it, “[i]nternational law knew 
no other legal subjects than the state . . . and had no room for 
Indigenous peoples.”27   
However, elements of Indigenous sovereignty have 
remained through centuries. 28   Despite the failures of 
national law to address Indigenous peoples’ rights 
adequately, elements of their sovereignty never went away.  
Nowadays, Indigenous peoples are seen “as entities actually 
owning the attributes of sovereignty pursuant to international 
law.”29  There has been “a paradigm shift in international 
law”30 and Indigenous peoples have been considered to be 
“legal subjects” under the same.31  Indigenous sovereignty 
means that indigenous peoples are entitled to “self-
                                                 
 24.  See Cayuga Indians (Great Britain) v. United States, 6 REV. INT’L 
ARBITRAL AWARDS 173, 176 (1926) (stating that an Indian tribe “is not a legal 
unit of international law.”) 
 25.  See The Double Life of International Law, supra note 4, at 1758 
(referring to the fact that for centuries Indigenous peoples used to be “the forgotten 
people of international law”). 
 26.  See Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Self-Determination, Culture, 
and Land: A Reassessment in Light of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN 
DECLARATION (CUP 2012) 31–63, 38 (Elvira Pulitano ed.) [hereinafter Wiessner, 
Indigenous Self-Determination]. 
 27.  Erica-Irene Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to their Natural 
Resources, in ARISTOTLE CONSTANTINIDES & NIKOS ZAIKOS, THE DIVERSITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). 
 28.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322323 (1978) (referring to 
“inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished”). 
 29.  Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and 
Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 TEX. INT’L L. REV. 155, 165 
(2007). 
 30.  MATTIAS ÅHRÉN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ STATUS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 149 (OUP 2016) (arguing that the recognition of 
Indigenous peoples as “peoples” “for international legal purposes can be described 
as nothing less than a paradigm shift in international law.”). 
 31.  For a seminal study see Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples 
in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
33, 34 (1994) (noting that “Indigenous peoples are gaining recognition of their 
legal personality as distinct societies with special collective rights and a distinct 
role in national and international decisionmaking”).  See also JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM 
VICTIMS TO ACTORS, II revised edition (Brill 2016) XIII (arguing that “Indigenous 
peoples have been the victims of international legal theories supporting the 
colonization of their territories . . . and that they have become subjects of 
protection under the main human rights treaties . . . to finally become more active 
and direct actors to the development of their own rights.”). 
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government” and “internal self-determination,” “the extent 
of which varies in the different States.”32  International law 
has finally recognized that Indigenous peoples are bearers of 
rights under international law both as individuals and as 
peoples. 33   Not only has international law increasingly 
regulated Indigenous peoples’ matters in the past half 
century,34  but Indigenous peoples are directly influencing 
and contributing to international law making. 35   Existing 
international law has been interpreted in a way favorable to 
Indigenous peoples.36  New international instruments have 
specifically recognized the rights of Indigenous peoples.37  
Finally, an emerging jurisprudence of various human rights 
bodies has coalesced reaffirming their rights.38  
  
                                                 
 32.  Lenzerini, supra note 29, at 165. 
 33.  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 2.   
 34.  Barsh, supra note 31, at 33 (pointing out that “[s]ince work began on 
the first United Nations study of discrimination against Indigenous ‘populations’ 
in 1971, the attention given to Indigenous peoples by international institutions and 
the participation of Indigenous peoples’ representatives in intergovernmental 
discussions have grown dramatically.”); see also José Paulo Kastrup, The 
Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human 
Rights Perspective, 32 TEX. INT’L L. J. 97, 98 (1997) (noting that “[i]n the past 
few decades, the international community has been presented with numerous 
agreements and new policies regarding the Indigenous rights.”); Kristen A. 
Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative 
Moment in Human Rights, 102 BERKELEY. L. REV. 173, 173 (2014) (highlighting 
that “[a]s [I]ndigenous peoples have become actively engaged in the human rights 
movement around the world, the sphere of international law, once deployed as a 
tool of imperial power and conquest, has begun to change shape. Increasingly, 
international human rights law serves as a basis for [I]ndigenous peoples’ claims 
against states . . . .”). 
 35.  Carpenter & Riley, supra note 34, at 177 (noting that “Indigenous 
peoples are influencing law around and outside of their communities, all the way 
up into state and international practice.”). 
 36.  The Double Life of International Law, supra note 4, at 1758 
(“Emerging [I]ndigenous rights norms have been promulgated through three main 
processes: (1) interpretation of existing international law in a way favorable to 
[I]ndigenous peoples’ aspirations; (2) promulgation of new international 
instruments specifically focused on Indigenous peoples’ rights; and (3) successful 
litigation before international [courts]”). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
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Among the human rights entitlements of Indigenous 
peoples, cultural entitlements are of particular importance.39  
If the “claims and aspirations” of Indigenous peoples “are 
diverse,” they present a common thread: the quest for 
safeguarding their heritage. 40   This does not exclude the 
relevance of other Indigenous rights.  On the contrary, not 
only are cultural rights complementary to other Indigenous 
rights, but the safeguarding of Indigenous cultural heritage is 
indissolubly “tied to their ancestral land” and to self-
determination.41  
Indigenous heritage appears in a number of international 
law instruments,42 and plays a central role in the UNDRIP.  
The Declaration is the product of two decades of preparatory 
work and “a milestone of re-empowerment” of Indigenous 
peoples.43  While this landmark instrument is currently not 
binding, this may change in the future to the extent that its 
provisions reflect customary international law and/or general 
principles of law.44  The Declaration constitutes a significant 
                                                 
 39.  LAURA WESTRA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 10 (2008) (discussing the “cultural integrity model” that 
“emphasizes the value of traditional cultures in themselves as well as for the rest 
of society”). 
 40.  Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2011) 
[hereinafter Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples]. 
 41.  Id. at 121–22 (noting that “[s]elf-determination was . . . redefined as 
the indispensable vehicle of preservation and flourishing of the culture of the 
group.”). 
 42.  See ILO Convention 169, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, art. 13(1) (1989), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100
_ILO_CODE:C169 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169] (providing that: “[i]n 
applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention governments shall respect 
the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples 
concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, 
which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this 
relationship”).  See also Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to 
Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural Identities of Indigenous Peoples under 
International Law (2005) 8 CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 201, 202 (describing how 
international organizations, including the United Nations and Organization of 
American States, have expressed the right to culture in their legal instruments). 
 43.  Wiessner, Indigenous Self-Determination, supra note 26, at 31. 
 44.  On the legal status of the Declaration, see Mauro Barelli, The Role 
of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 957, 983 
(2009) (arguing that “regardless of its non-binding nature, the Declaration has the 
potential effectively to promote and protect the rights of the world’s [I]ndigenous 
peoples” and that “the relevance of a soft law instrument cannot be aprioristically 
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achievement for Indigenous peoples worldwide as it brings 
Indigenous peoples’ rights and cultural heritage to the 
forefront of international law.45  Indigenous culture is a key 
theme of the Declaration.46  Many articles are devoted to 
different aspects of Indigenous culture; the word “culture” 
appears no less than thirty times in its text.47  Not only does 
the UNDRIP recognize the dignity and diversity of 
Indigenous peoples’ culture but it also acknowledges its 
essential contribution to the “diversity and richness of 
civilization and cultures, which constitute the common 
heritage of mankind.”48  
The Declaration recognizes the right of Indigenous 
peoples to practice their cultural traditions49 and maintain 
their distinctive spiritual and material relationship with the 
land that they have traditionally owned, occupied, or 
otherwise used.50  For most, if not all, Indigenous peoples, 
land is not only the basis of economic livelihood, but also the 
source of spiritual and cultural identity.51  They “see the land 
and the sea, all of the sites they contain and the knowledge 
and the laws associated with those sites as a single entity that 
must be protected as a whole.” 52   Because Indigenous 
peoples often have this holistic approach, a U.N. study 
acknowledges that “[a]ll elements of heritage should be 
                                                 
dismissed”); International Law Association, Comm. on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Res. No. 5/2012 (Aug. 2012) (noting that “UNDRIP as a whole cannot 
yet be considered a statement of existing customary international law.  However, 
it includes several key provisions which correspond to existing state obligations 
under customary international law.”). 
 45.  ELVIRA PULITANO, Indigenous Rights and International Law: An 
Introduction, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION 25 
(CUP 2012). 
 46.  See generally Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
supra note 40, at 139 (describing international and governmental efforts to protect 
the rights and cultural heritage of Indigenous peoples).   
 47.  See Yvonne Donders, The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. A Victory for Cultural Autonomy?, in CHANGING 
PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (Ineke Boerefijn & 
Jenny Goldschmidt eds., 2008). 
 48.  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 49.  Id. art. 11. 
 50.  Id. arts. 8, 11, 12.1, 13.1. 
 51.  See Jérémie Gilbert, Custodians of the Land – Indigenous Peoples, 
Human Rights and Cultural Integrity, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY, HERITAGE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 31–44 (Michele Langfield et. al. eds. 2010). 
 52.  Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal 
Mining Company Agreements in Australia, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 25, 27 (2003). 
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managed and protected as a single, interrelated and 
integrated whole.” 53   For the same reason, [I]ndigenous 
culture “often cannot be preserved in locations outside 
traditionally [I]ndigenous territories.”54  
The linkage between culture and land does not merely 
have a normative character, but also a semantic one.  The 
very word “culture” derives from the Latin term cultura 
meaning “cultivation, care; husbandry” and the Latin verb 
colere meaning “to cultivate, . . . inhabit; protect, nurture; 
honour, [and] worship.” 55   Therefore, the term culture 
indicates “activities that are closely connected to place and 
place attachment associated with rituals and spirituality.”56  
In parallel, “heritage” derives from the Latin word hereditas 
indicating “something [that] is left behind,” that is “filled 
with meanings” and “that convey[s] values for the next 
generation.”57  For Indigenous peoples, cultural heritage has 
“a temporal dimension that moves simultaneously in two 
directions”: the past and the future. 58   For Indigenous 
peoples, cultural heritage transforms the past into a tool to 
address present needs and future challenges.59  
For Indigenous peoples, cultural heritage is a mix of 
tangible and intangible elements that contributes to personal 
identity, life-values, and resilience.  For them, culture and 
nature are “deeply interconnected by their holistic view of 
land.”60  They do not differentiate between cultural heritage 
on the one hand and natural heritage on the other.61  Rather, 
                                                 
 53.  Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur, Comm. On Human Rights, 
Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on 
the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1993/28, at 9 (1993). 
 54.  The Double Life of International Law, supra note 4, at 1759. 
 55.  Johan Josefsson & Inga-Lill Aronsson, Heritage as Life-Values: A 
Study of the Cultural Heritage Concept, 110 CURRENT SCI. 2091, 2091–98 (2016). 
 56.  Id. at 2091. 
 57.  Id. at 2092. 
 58.  Tumu te Heuheu, Merata Kawharu & R. Ariihau Tuheiava, World 
Heritage and Indigeneity, WORLD HERITAGE, Feb. 2012, at 17. 
 59.  Josefsson & Aronsson, supra note 55, at 2093–95 (noting that 
“memories of past events . . . can be used in order to build or strengthen our 
identity.”). 
 60.  Interview with Myrna Cunningham, Chair of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, WORLD HERITAGE, Feb. 2012, at 54–57 
[hereinafter Interview with Myrna Cunningham]. 
 61.  Josefsson & Aronsson, supra note 55, at 2098 (noting that for 
Indigenous peoples, “the nature of cultural heritage and the culture of natural 
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their cultural traditions “are inseparable from their lands, 
territories and natural resources.”62  Tangible and intangible 
qualities of heritage “become blurred when viewed through 
an [I]ndigenous lens” and “fuse into one.”63   
Some scholars caution that emphasizing the cultural 
entitlements of Indigenous peoples can reduce their political 
rights and limit their claims to self-determination. 64  
According to these authors, overemphasizing Indigenous 
culture risks undermining Indigenous self-determination.65  
On the contrary, this Article argues that without protection 
of Indigenous cultural identity, heritage, and rights, all of the 
other claims of Indigenous peoples lose strength.66  Cultural 
claims do not replace other claims; rather, they complement 
and reinforce them.  Human rights are indivisible.67  The 
UNDRIP acknowledges the importance of Indigenous 
cultures and adopts this holistic understanding of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights.  In fact, the protection of the cultural identity 
                                                 
heritage are in sublime harmony”). 
 62.  Interview with Myrna Cunningham, supra note 60, at 54. 
 63.  Heuheu, Kawharu & Tuheiava, supra note 58, at 17. 
 64.  See A. Claire Cutler, Indigenous Identity, International Law and the 
New Constitutionalism 1, 12 (June 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (noting that “Indigenous peoples’ claims to self-determination have 
generally proceeded through the legal forms provided for peoples and 
collectivities through the prism of cultural rights”); Kirsty Gover, The Elusive 
Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy by Karen Engle 12 
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 419, 419 (2011)  (noting that scholars “worry that limits 
may be imposed on the content of indigenous ‘culture’ in order to confine states’ 
human rights obligations”); KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF 
INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT—RIGHTS, CULTURE, STRATEGY 1–2 (2010) 
(arguing that “cultural rights have provided the dominant framework for 
indigenous rights advocacy since at least the 1990s” and suggesting that “increased 
cultural rights sometimes lead to decreased opportunities for autonomy and 
development”).  
 65.  Cutler, supra note 64, at 12 (cautioning that there is tendency “to 
treat cultural rights as less fundamental than other human rights.”), 20 (noting “the 
emergence of a different approach to culture that is having some impact on state 
practices.  This approach treats culture, not as a noun or a good to be owned, 
bought, or sold, but as an activity to be enhanced, nurtured, and preserved, and is 
evident in recent international documents and interpretations addressing the 
cultural heritage of Indigenous peoples.”). 
 66.  Cindy Holder, Culture as an Activity and Human Right: An 
Important Advance for Indigenous Peoples and International Law, 33 
ALTERNATIVES 7, 7 (2008) (highlighting that “protecting the capacity of both 
peoples and persons to engage in culture is taken to be as basic a component of 
human dignity”). 
 67.  Amund Sinding-Larsen, Our Common Dignity: Rights-Based 
Approaches to Heritage Management, 68 WORLD HERITAGE 58, 58 (2012). 
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of Indigenous peoples is at the heart of the UNDRIP,68 and 
“one can find the cultural rights angle in each article of the 
Declaration.”69   Therefore, recognizing the importance of 
Indigenous culture not only adds to, but is of vital importance 
to, recognizing, protecting, and fulfilling the human rights of 
Indigenous peoples.  
A particularly significant limitation of the legal 
framework protecting Indigenous cultural heritage is the 
absence—aside from the classical human rights 
mechanisms—of an international court where Indigenous 
peoples can raise complaints regarding measures that affect 
them.70  Human rights may be claimed before national courts 
and regional human rights courts, as well as through 
particular complaint mechanisms at the U.N. level.71  Several 
human rights treaties set up “international mechanisms for 
monitoring states’ compliance with human rights, and some 
even authorize individuals or groups to file complaints 
before a court or commission alleging state human rights 
violations.” 72   However, none of these mechanisms has 
jurisdiction over private parties. 73   At best, communities 
impacted by foreign direct investment (FDI) can “obtain an 
award against the state in which violations [of human rights] 
occurred.”74  Nonetheless, this “may be unsatisfactory . . . 
because states sometimes fail to comply with the 
determinations of human rights bodies, and options for 
enforcing those determinations are limited or non-
existent.”75  Finally, regional human rights courts have “a 
limited geographical scope” and are present only in several 
                                                 
 68.  Francesco Francioni, The Human Dimension of International 
Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 15 (2011). 
 69.  Elsa Stamatopoulou, Taking Cultural Rights Seriously: The Vision 
of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON 
THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 387, 392 
(Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011). 
 70.  Manfred Nowak, The Need for a World Court of Human Rights, 7 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251, 252–54 (2007) (calling for the institution of a World Court 
of Human Rights). 
 71.  Irene Watson & Sharon Venne, Talking Up Indigenous Peoples’ 
Original Intent in a Space Dominated by State Interventions, in INDIGENOUS 
RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION 87, 96, 106 (Elvira Pulitano ed. 
2012). 
 72.  Foster, Investors, States, and Stakeholders, supra note 5, at 390.  
 73.  Id. at 390. 
       74.     Id.   
 75.  Id. at 391. 
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regions of the world.76 
The UNDRIP does not change this situation.  Therefore, 
notwithstanding the major political merits of the Declaration, 
as one author puts it, “UNDRIP does not definitively resolve, 
but at best temporarily mediates, multiple tensions.”77  The 
UNDRIP constitutes a milestone, achieved after decades of 
elaboration.  However, it does not fully address the 
remaining power imbalances among investors, states, and 
Indigenous peoples, thus requiring further analysis and 
action.  
II.  INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE AND THE 
DIASPORA OF INDIGENOUS CULTURE-RELATED DISPUTES 
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY TRIBUNALS 
International investment law is a well-developed field of 
study within the broader international law framework.78  As 
there is no single comprehensive global investment treaty, 
investors’ rights are defined by an array of IIAs, customary 
international law, and general principles of law. 79  
International investment law provides extensive protection 
to investors’ rights in order to encourage FDI and to foster 
economic development. 80   At the substantive level, IIAs 
provide, inter alia, for adequate compensation for 
expropriated property, protection against unlawful 
expropriation and discrimination, fair and equitable 
                                                 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  See Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 141, 163 (2011) (contending that “[i]f we are willing to examine it critically, 
the UNDRIP may have the potential to become an important site for the ongoing 
struggle over the meaning of human rights”). 
 78.  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 6, at 240 (noting that 
“international investment law constitutes a well-developed part of public 
international law”). 
 79.  M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 79, 87 (3rd ed. 2010) (enumerating the sources of international 
investment law: treaties, custom, general principles of law and considering judicial 
decisions as subsidiary sources of international (investment) law). 
 80.  Genevieve Fox, A Future for International Investment? Modifying 
BITS to Drive Economic Development, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 229, 229 (2014) 
(highlighting that “[s]ince the conception of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
in the late 1950s, developed (home) and developing (host) states have signed on 
to BITs with two distinct desires: home states seek to establish BITs in order to 
protect their investors and their investments from deleterious host state action, 
while host states sign BITs pursuant to the notion that such action brings increased 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and related economic development.”). 
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treatment, full protection and security, and assurances that 
the host country will honor its commitments regarding the 
investment.81 
At the procedural level, international investment law is 
characterized by sophisticated dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 82   While state-to-state arbitration has been 
rare, 83  investor–state arbitration has become the most 
successful mechanism for settling investment-related 
disputes. 84   Nowadays, most IIAs provide investors with 
direct access to an international arbitral tribunal.85  Arbitral 
tribunals are typically composed of an uneven number of 
members, most frequently three. 86   All arbitrators are 
                                                 
 81.  VALENTINA VADI, PROPORTIONALITY, REASONABLENESS AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 9 (2018) [hereinafter VADI, PROPORTIONALITY] (noting that 
“[typically, after defining foreign investors and their investments, IIAs include 
provisions on non-discrimination . . . , minimum standards, and fair and equitable 
treatment.  Other common provisions in investment treaties concern the 
repatriation of profits . . . or . . . stabilization clauses”), 10 (“[p]rotection against 
unlawful expropriation and guarantees of compensation in the event of 
nationalization, expropriation or indirect expropriation constitute the core of 
investment treaties.”). 
 82.  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 6, at 240 (noting that 
international investment law “presents a sophisticated dispute settlement 
mechanism.”). 
 83.  On state-to-state investment treaty arbitration, see Anthea Roberts, 
State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent 
Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1–70 (2014) 
(noting that “Most investment treaties contain two dispute resolution clauses: one 
permitting investor-state arbitration for investment disputes and the other 
permitting state-to-state arbitration for disputes concerning the treaty’s 
interpretation and/or application. Despite this duality, the potential role of state-
to-state arbitration, and its proper relationship with investor-state arbitration, have 
largely been ignored.”); Michele Potestà, Towards a Greater Role for State-to-
State Arbitration in the Architecture of Investment Treaties?, in THE ROLE OF THE 
STATE IN INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 249, 250 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo 
Polanco Lazo eds., 2015) (noting that “[d]espite being incorporated in almost 
every BIT, State-to-State dispute settlement clauses have attracted very little 
attention . . . due to [their] limited use in practice”). 
 84.  See Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 435–89 (2009). 
 85.  VADI, PROPORTIONALITY, supra note 81, at 11 (noting that “[s]ince 
the 1980s, investor–state arbitration has become a standard feature in international 
investment treaties for the settlement of disputes that arise between the foreign 
investor and the host state.”). 
 86.  Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 387, 397 (2014) (noting that “ICSID arbitration tribunals are typically 
composed of three members.”); Antonio R. Parra, The Initiation of Proceedings 
and Constitution of Tribunals in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, in ARBITRATION 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY 
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required to be independent and impartial.87  The use of the 
arbitration model is aimed at depoliticizing disputes, 
avoiding potential national court bias, and ensuring the 
advantages of confidentiality and effectiveness. 88   Once 
proceedings are initiated by an investor, arbitral tribunals 
review state acts in light of their relative investment treaties.  
Given the structural imbalance between the vague and 
non-binding dispute settlement mechanisms provided by 
human rights treaties and the highly effective and 
sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms available under 
international investment law, cultural disputes involving the 
rights of investors and Indigenous peoples have been brought 
before investment treaty arbitral tribunals.89            
One may wonder whether the fact that cultural disputes 
tend to be adjudicated before international investment treaty 
tribunals results in institutional bias. 90   Investment treaty 
standards are vague91 and their language covers a potentially 
wide variety of state regulation that may interfere with 
                                                 
ISSUES 105, 113–115 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010) (discussing the 
appointment of arbitrators under different arbitral rules). 
 87.  Parra, supra note 86, at 116 (discussing the requirements of 
impartiality and independence under different arbitral rules). 
 88.  See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of 
Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV–FOREIGN INV. 
L.J. 1, 1–25 (1986). 
 89.  Obviously, this does not mean that these are the only available fora 
for this kind of dispute.  Other tribunals are available such as national courts, 
human rights courts, regional economic courts, and traditional state-to-state courts 
and tribunals such as the International Court of Justice or even inter-state 
arbitration.  Some of these dispute settlement mechanisms may be more suitable 
than investor–state arbitration to address cultural concerns.  However, given its 
scope, this study focuses on the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals. 
 90.  For a seminal investigation see Valentina Vadi, Socio-Legal 
Perspectives on the Adjudication of Cultural Diversity Disputes in International 
Economic Law, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1–24 (2011). 
 91.  Geoffrey Gertz & Taylor St John, State Interpretations of Investment 
Treaties: Feasible Strategies for Developing Countries, Blavatnik Sch. of Gov’t, 
Glob. Econ. Governance Programme, at 1, 2 (2015), http://geg-
test.nsms.ox.ac.uk/sites/geg/files/GEG%20Gertz%20and%20St%20John%20Jun
e2015_A.pdf (noting that “Many investment treaties contain broad standards and 
vague language, leaving the arbitration tribunals that decide investment treaty 
cases with substantial discretion.  This discretion means arbitration rulings can be 
unpredictable, as different groups of arbitrators may draw different conclusions 
from the same set of facts.  And when arbitrators use their discretion to adopt 
expansive interpretations of state obligations, states may perceive that investment 
treaties are being used by investors in ways governments didn’t intend or foresee.  
With arbitration awards against states sometimes reaching hundreds of millions of 
dollars, the stakes over interpretation are high.”). 
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economic interests.92   Therefore, a tension exists when a 
state adopts regulatory measures interfering with foreign 
investments, as regulation may be considered as violating 
substantive standards of treatment under IIAs and the foreign 
investor may claim compensation before arbitral tribunals.  
The architecture of the arbitral process also raises significant 
concerns in the context of disputes involving Indigenous 
peoples.  While arbitration structurally constitutes a private 
model of adjudication, substantively, arbitral awards 
ultimately shape the relationship between the state and 
private individuals.93  Arbitrators determine matters such as 
the legality of governmental activity, the degree to which 
foreign investors should be protected from state action, and 
the appropriate role of the state. 94   Evidently, disputes 
determined within this dispute settlement mechanism can 
potentially affect the human rights of Indigenous peoples.  
Yet, arbitrators may not have specific expertise in human 
rights law.  
Moreover, investor–state arbitration distinguishes 
between two types of non-state actors: (i) the investor 
engaged in FDI and (ii) the FDI-impacted non-state actors.95  
While foreign investors have direct access to investor–state 
arbitration, the FDI-impacted Indigenous peoples do not 
have immediate access to transnational courts.  Rather, they 
have access to local courts and only after the exhaustion of 
local remedies can they eventually have access to regional 
human rights courts and relevant U.N. mechanisms. 96  
Furthermore, foreign investors can challenge domestic court 
decisions (upholding complaints brought by locals against 
the same investors) before an arbitral tribunal on the grounds 
that they constitute wrongful interference with the 
                                                 
 92.  Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential 
Standard of Review?, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 87, 88 (2012) (noting that investment 
treaty arbitration “can tread on delicate issues typically within the domaine réservé 
of states.”). 
 93.  GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND 
PUBLIC LAW 70 (2007). 
 94.  M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalizations and the International 
Law on Foreign Investment, 10 CAN. FOREIGN POL’Y 1, 1–18 (2003). 
 95.  Noemi Gal-Or, The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global 
Citizens: Proposing a New Interpretation in the Legitimacy Debate, 32 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 271, 271–301 (2009). 
 96.  Francioni, Access to Justice, supra note 11, at 63–64, 72. 
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investment.97  Therefore, investor–state arbitration “transfers 
power and authority from states to investors,”98 “amplifies 
pre-existing power differentials” 99  and “maximiz[es] 
investor protection.”100 
The increasing impact of FDI on the social sphere of the 
host state “has raised the question on whether the principle 
of access to justice, as successfully developed to the benefit 
of investors through the provision of binding arbitration, 
ought to be matched by a corresponding right to a remedial 
process for individuals and communities adversely affected 
by the investment in the host state.”101  While the recognition 
of multinational corporations as “international corporate 
citizens” has progressed,102 by comparison, the procedural 
rights of Indigenous peoples have remained unchanged.  At 
the same time, however, Indigenous peoples have clearly 
defined rights under international law.  The following Part 
addresses the question as to whether the human rights of 
Indigenous peoples play any role in the context of 
international disputes before international investment treaty 
tribunals. 
  
                                                 
 97.  Id. at 738.  See also Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-
23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), https://www.italaw.com/cases/257 (the inhabitants of 
the Ecuadorian Amazon allegedly experienced serious illnesses because of 
pollution from oil operations carried out by the company Texaco.  The Ecuadorian 
court issued an $18 billion judgment against Chevron, Texaco’s successor.  
However, Chevron initiated investor–state arbitration contending that domestic 
proceedings were in breach of investment treaty provisions.)  For additional 
commentary, see Lise Johnson, Case Note: How Chevron v. Ecuador is Pushing 
the Boundaries of Arbitral Authority, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, 13 April 2012 
(noting that “The tribunal’s awards have prompted backlash and questions 
regarding the scope of the arbitrators’ authority.”).  
 98.  Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment 
Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L. REV. 465, 492 (2005). 
 99.  Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, Discussion Paper No. 16-28: The 
David Effect and ISDS, ARIZ. LEGAL STUD., at 10 (2017). 
 100.  Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: 
Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative 
Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J. INT’L. (2014) 1147, 1150. 
 101.  Francioni, Access to Justice, supra note 11, at 71. 
 102.  Peter Muchlinski, Global Bukovina Examined: Viewing the 
Multinational Enterprise as a Transnational Law-Making Community, in 
GUNTHER TEUBNER, GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 97 (Dartmouth, 1997) 
(citation omitted).  
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III.  WHEN CULTURES COLLIDE 
The development of natural resources within and near to 
traditional Indigenous areas is ever increasing.  While 
development analysts consider extractive projects as anti-
poverty measures and advocate FDI as a major catalyst for 
development,103 “for the most part, the peoples in the areas 
where the resources are located tend to bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative impacts of 
development through reduced access to resources and direct 
exposure to pollution and environmental degradation.”104  In 
particular, rising investment in the extractive industries can 
have a devastating impact on the livelihood of Indigenous 
peoples.105  
The interplay between investors’ rights and Indigenous 
peoples’ rights has been discussed by domestic courts106 and 
by human rights bodies at the regional and international 
levels.107  While this jurisprudence and the relevant literature 
are extensive, the emerging jurisprudence of investment 
treaty arbitral tribunals dealing with elements of Indigenous 
cultural heritage remains understudied.  This Article builds 
upon previous studies108 and contributes to the state of the art 
                                                 
 103.  See OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 3 
(2002). 
 104.  Lila Barrera Hernández, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and 
Natural Resource Development: Chile’s Mapuche People and the Right to Water, 
ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 6 (2005). 
 105.  See generally Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: 
Investor–State Disputes and The Protection of the Environment in Developing 
Countries, 6 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 73–100 (2006) (describing how 
the alteration of the natural landscape affects indigenous peoples’ relationship with 
land, their lifestyle, and worldview). 
 106.  At the national level, see, e.g. Hupacasath First Nation v. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada and The Attorney General of Canada, 
Judgment of 9 January 2015, 2015 FCA 4 (CanLII) (the Canadian Federal Court 
dismissed an application by the Hupacasath First Nation, an aboriginal band in 
British Columbia, to stay the Canada–China investment treaty until First Nations 
have been consulted, holding that any potential adverse impacts are non-
appreciable and speculative in nature). 
 107.  For a discussion see Valentina Vadi, Natural Resources and 
Indigenous Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration, in 
KATE MILES, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter 
Vadi, Natural Resources].   
 108.  Earlier studies include VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 6, at 
204–36; Vadi, When Cultures Collide, supra note 6, at 797–889; Vadi, Natural 
Resources, supra note 107 (all discussing an earlier set of arbitrations); Valentina 
Vadi, Global v. Local: The Protection of Indigenous Heritage in International 
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by examining and critically assessing a number of recent 
arbitrations and by proposing policy options to address the 
power imbalance between international investment law and 
the human rights system.  
Given the impact that arbitral awards can have on 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage and rights, and the 
growing number of investment arbitrations, scrutiny and 
critical assessment of this jurisprudence is particularly timely 
and important.  On the one hand, such scrutiny illuminates 
the way international investment law responds to human 
rights concerns in its operation, thus contributing to the 
ongoing investigation on the role of international investment 
law within its broader matrix of international law.  On the 
other hand, this scrutiny calls for strengthening the human 
rights system to redress some institutional imbalance with 
international investment law.  
With regard to the subject matter of these arbitrations, 
most relate to the extractive industries; cases that involve 
other types of business remain atypical.  This Article adopts 
a broad notion of heritage inclusive of both cultural and 
natural heritage, given that Indigenous peoples do not 
separate these types of heritage.  This approach is also well-
known to international lawyers as one of the most important 
UNESCO instruments protecting world heritage similarly 
governs both natural and cultural heritage.109   
With regard to the actors involved, in general terms, 
investment disputes with Indigenous cultural elements are 
characterized by the host state’s need to balance the 
protection of the human rights of Indigenous peoples with 
the rights of foreign investors.  However, atypical cases arise 
in which Indigenous peoples file investment disputes qua 
investors.  Moreover, Indigenous peoples can participate to 
the proceedings as amici curiae. 
To date, the crossover of international investment law and 
the rights of Indigenous peoples has arisen in four ways.110  
                                                 
Economic Law, in S. SARGENT & JO SAMANTHA, A NEW MILLENNIUM FOR 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 7–36 (Buckingham Univ. Press 2017), (discussing an earlier 
investment arbitration and an analogous World Trade Organization case 
concerning indigenous cultural heritage). 
 109.  Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, 16 November 1972, in force Dec. 17, 1975, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. 
 110.  Here, I follow the useful analytical framework elaborated by Judith 
Levine.  See Judith Levine, The Interaction of International Investment Arbitration 
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First, as investors, Indigenous peoples have filed claims 
before arbitral tribunals qua foreign investors, alleging that 
the host state failed to consider their human rights.  Second, 
foreign investors have filed claims against the host state 
contending that regulatory measures protecting Indigenous 
cultural rights or their heritage were in breach of relevant 
investment treaty provisions.  Third, foreign investors have 
filed claims against host states contending that the latter 
failed to protect the former or their investments against 
actions of Indigenous peoples.  Finally, groups of Indigenous 
peoples, who are not party to a given arbitration but have an 
interest in the outcome of the same, have sought permission 
to intervene in the proceedings.  This Article proceeds by 
examining each of these different types of intersections 
between investors’ rights and the rights of Indigenous 
peoples. 
A.  Indigenous Peoples Qua Investors 
In an atypical case, Indigenous peoples acting qua foreign 
investors have complained about measures adopted by the 
host states, alleging that the state failed to take their human 
rights into account.  In Grand River v. United States,111 a 
Canadian tobacco distribution company composed of 
Indigenous peoples contended that the Master Settlement 
Agreement—an agreement between tobacco companies and 
major tobacco producers in the United States—was being 
applied to their business without their input.  For the 
company, this allegedly violated customary law requiring 
consultation, if not consent, of Indigenous peoples on 
regulatory matters potentially affecting them. 112   The 
Arbitral Tribunal, however, did not find any violation of fair 
and equitable treatment (the minimum standard due to 
investors under Article 1105 of NAFTA),113 albeit admitting, 
                                                 
and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in Freya Baetens (ed.) INVESTMENT LAW 
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW—INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES (CUP 2013) 
107–128.  In earlier studies, I developed a different analytical framework based on 
the investment claims (expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection 
and security, etc.)  See VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 6, at 204–36; 
Vadi, When Cultures Collide, supra note 6, at 797–889.  
 111.  Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Award, 
NAFTA Trib. (Jam. 12, 2011).  
 112.  Id. ¶ 182(3). 
 113.  Id. ¶ 187 (holding that “whatever unfair treatment was rendered [to 
the claimant] or his business enterprise, it did not rise to the level of an infraction 
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in passing, that Indigenous peoples should be consulted on 
matters potentially affecting them.114  
In the reasoning of the Tribunal, two holdings and one 
important gap in legal reasoning related to indigenous 
peoples’ rights in investment treaty arbitration can be found.  
First, according to the Tribunal, fair and equitable treatment 
“does not incorporate other legal protections that may be 
provided to investors or classes of investors under other 
sources of law.”115  “To hold otherwise”—argues the Grand 
River Tribunal—”would make Article 1105 a vehicle for 
generally litigating claims based on alleged infractions of 
domestic and international law and thereby unduly 
circumvent the limited reach of Article 1105 as determined 
by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Free Trade Commission in its binding directive.” 116   In 
reaching this outcome, the Tribunal was guided by the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s statement that 
“determination that there has been a breach . . . of a separate 
international agreement does not establish that there has been 
a breach of Article 1105.”117  
Second, the Tribunal held that NAFTA Article 1105 
required a uniform standard of treatment for all foreign 
investments, rather than admitting specialized procedural 
rights owing to some categories for investors (e.g., 
Indigenous persons).118  
Third, the arbitrators did not discuss the role that Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) can play in investor–state arbitration as a tool to 
                                                 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard of 1105, which is limited to the 
customary international law standard of treatment of aliens.”). 
 114.  Id. ¶ 210 (noting that “It may well be, as the Claimants urged, that 
there does exist a principle of customary international law requiring governmental 
authorities to consult Indigenous peoples on governmental policies or actions 
significantly affecting them.”). 
 115.  Id. ¶ 219. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain 
Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001), 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp.   
 118.  Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, ¶ 213 (arguing that “[t]he 
notion of specialized procedural rights protecting some investors, but not others, 
cannot readily be reconciled with the idea of a minimum customary standard of 
treatment due to all investments.”). 
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defragment international law.119   Article 31(3)(c) requires 
adjudicators to take account of “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.” 120   Although Article 31(3)(c) cannot trigger the 
importation of external norms into a given treaty system or 
provide the claimants with the capacity to claim for the 
breach of such external obligations, it enables such external 
rules to shape an arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of a given 
investment treaty provision.  
In conclusion, the Grand River award is significant 
because it admits, albeit in passing, that Indigenous peoples 
should be consulted on matters potentially affecting them.  
The Tribunal states that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard cannot be used to import external norms into the 
text of IIAs.  Nonetheless, the award does not discuss the 
potentially significant role that Article 31(3)(c) could play in 
investment arbitration. 
B.  States as Respondents and Trustees of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights  
Foreign investors have filed claims against the host state 
contending that regulatory measures protecting Indigenous 
cultural rights or their heritage were in breach of relevant 
investment treaty provisions.  In these cases, the respondent 
states act as trustees of Indigenous peoples’ rights.  
For instance, in Ras al-Khaimah Inv. Authority v. India, an 
Emirati investor in an aluminum refinery project served India 
with a notice of arbitration under the U.A.E.–India Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT). 121   The company had signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the state of 
Andhra Pradesh, under which the latter would supply the 
former with bauxite.122  However, the project was met with 
local opposition, reportedly because the government planned 
to mine the bauxite on reserved tribal land. 123   After the 
government cancelled the MoU, the company  filed a formal 
                                                 
 119.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 
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notice.124  
According to an international development scholar, “[t]wo 
dominant discourses” have emerged with regard to bauxite 
mining in Eastern India.125  On the one hand, the “life-giving 
discourse” opposes mining because it sees the bauxite-
bearing hills as “an essential part of a wider ecosystem that 
supports sustainable, [I]ndigenous communities,” such as the 
Adivasi.126  This view favors the conservation of “holistic 
ecosystems in support of traditional lifestyles”127 by noting 
that bauxite hills have geological features that can be “life-
giving”; in fact, because the bauxite ore has a porous 
structure and the “unique ability to store water from the 
previous monsoon, it “slowly release[s] it into hill streams” 
throughout the year.128  On the other hand, “the pro-mining 
‘treasure chest’ discourse” considers bauxite hills as possible 
mines “for the benefit of the nation.”129  This “materialistic” 
vision of mineral extraction “builds on an ideology of 
modernization and economic development via 
industrialization present in top policymaking circles ever 
since independence.”130  Yet, under the Indian Forest Rights 
Act (FRA), “tribal people are the natural owners of minerals 
available in reserve forests.”131  As the case is still at a very 
early phase, it is not possible to foresee whether the case will 
be settled or how the Arbitral Tribunal will decide it. 
Analogously, in 2015, a Costa Rican company and several 
Dutch investors, all shareholders of an ecotourism project 
called Cañaveral in Bocas del Toro, Panama, filed a claim 
against Panama at the International Center for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 132   Reportedly, the 
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company contested decisions taken by the Panamanian 
National Land Management Agency concerning the question 
on whether the claimants’ property is located within the 
protected area inhabited by the Ngöbe Buglé Indigenous 
peoples in Western Panama.133  
Ngöbe land originally extended from the Pacific Ocean to 
the Caribbean Sea 134  and the Ngöbe tend to rely on 
subsistence activities such as farming, fishing, and 
hunting.135  In 1997, a state law established the Comarca 
Ngöbe-Buglé, a specially designated area (comarca) to 
promote the wellbeing of these Indigenous communities.136  
This law also recognized the right of Indigenous persons to 
collective ownership of land within these zones and grants 
Indigenous tribes a certain autonomy.137  For human rights 
scholars, this and similar laws were interpreted to constitute 
“one of the foremost achievements in terms of the protection 
of Indigenous rights in the world.”138  
Reportedly, “the investment at the heart of the dispute . . . 
comprised of four farm properties situated along the 
Panamanian coast, which the investors planned to develop as 
an eco-tourist project” 139  and the dispute focused on 
“whether two of these farms are located in the Comarca.”140  
In fact, the National Authority for Lands Administration 
“issued a report that officially located two of the claimants’ 
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properties outside this special zone.”141  According to the 
claimants, “this led to the invasion of these properties by 
Indigenous groups.”142  The claimants alleged that Panama’s 
treatment of their investment constitutes an indirect 
expropriation and a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
as well as the full protection and security standards.143  As 
the case is still at a very early phase, it is not possible to 
foresee whether the case will be settled or how the Arbitral 
Tribunal will decide it.  
In another pending case against Panama, Dominion 
Minerals Corp. v. The Republic of Panama,144 the claimant, 
a U.S. company, contended that Panama used environmental 
pretexts to deny renewal of a mining exploration permit to 
the local subsidiary of the company and this amounted to an 
indirect expropriation of the claimant’s investment in Cerro 
Chorca, a mining property in Western Panama.145  For the 
claimant, the fact that a subsequent law admitted foreign 
investments in the mineral sectors showed that the mineral 
moratorium was enacted to expropriate the investment of the 
claimant rather than to generally halt the extraction of 
mineral resources. 146   After the regulatory change that 
permitted mining, the government faced social unrest.  In 
fact, “the Ng[ö]be-Bugl[é] [I]ndigenous people . . . staged a 
series of violent protests and road blockades” in opposition 
to such law, because they “[f]ear[ed] that [it] would allow 
foreign state-owned companies to undertake large-scale 
mining projects on [I]ndigenous lands.” 147   Furthermore, 
they were “outraged” by the adoption of the law despite 
“their public opposition.” 148   Reportedly, “various 
representatives of the Panamanian government tried to 
persuade the Ng[ö]be-Bugl[é] [I]ndigenous people to accept 
mining in Cerro Chorcha . . . given the economic benefits 
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such activity brought.”149  Because the government “faced 
. . . the threat of continuing social unrest[,]” it finally placed 
“a moratorium on all mining activity within the . . . regions 
inhabited by the Ng[ö]be-Bugl[é] [I]ndigenous peoples, 
which included Cerro Chorcha.” 150   In conclusion, the 
claimant contends that “Panama’s actions amounted to an 
expropriation . . . as they had the effect of depriving 
Claimant of . . . its investment in Cerro Chorcha”151 and a 
breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard.  
Yet, for the Indigenous peoples “[t]hese mountains are 
sacred”152  For the Ngöbe, their ancestors buried:    
[E]vil spirits in these mountains so that they could not disturb the 
villages on the slopes below.  To make sure the spirits remained 
imprisoned, the hills have been off-limits to farming, hunting, and 
logging for generations, in effect creating an ecological preserve 
that protects the natural resources on which the Ngöbe depend.153   
Therefore, it seems that for the Ngöbe, the prospect of an 
open-pit copper mine threatens the destruction of the 
landscape of Cerro Chorcha, eventually releasing the spirits 
confined in it, and altering the fragile balance of this 
mountain ecosystem. 
In the renowned case, Glamis Gold v. United States,154 a 
Canadian investor claimed, inter alia, that measures 
requiring the backfilling of a previously extracted open-pit 
gold mine to preserve the skyline of ancient Indigenous 
pilgrimage route amounted to an indirect expropriation of its 
investment and/or a violation of fair and equitable 
treatment.155  The Arbitral Tribunal, however, dismissed the 
claims, holding that the investment remained profitable156 
and that none of the government actions breached the fair and 
equitable treatment standard.  
In Crystallex v. Venezuela,157 a Canadian company that 
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had invested in one of the largest gold deposits in the world, 
the Las Cristinas deposit in Venezuela, claimed that the 
conduct of Venezuela in relation to the mine amounted to an 
expropriation, a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, and a violation of the full protection and security 
standard.158  The state authorities denied an environmental 
permit that Crystallex needed for the exploitation of the mine 
because of concerns about the project’s impact on the 
environment and on an Indigenous community at the Imataca 
Forest reserve.159  Yet, the claimant pointed out that “the 
justifications adduced by the Ministry of Environment” for 
denying the permit, that is, “concerns for the environmental 
and [I]ndigenous people . . . had never been raised during the 
four-year approval process and were not supported by a 
single study . . . to demonstrate that the project would 
adversely impact the Imataca region.”160  While Crystallex 
claimed that it had consulted the relevant Indigenous 
communities, 161  Venezuela argued that the company had 
inadequately addressed “specific issues or concerns 
identified by the Ministry (such as . . . local [I]ndigenous 
culture and traditions).”162    
The Tribunal found that Venezuela breached the fair and 
equitable treatment standard when it denied the 
environmental permit.  In fact, a letter from the state 
authorities had created legitimate expectations that the 
project would proceed.163  Moreover, the Tribunal found that 
the subsequent permit denial letter did not sufficiently 
elucidate reasons for denial; rather, it “extend[ed] to a mere 
two and a half pages,” and vaguely referred to “serious 
environmental deterioration in the rivers, soils, flora, fauna 
                                                 
ARB(AF)/11/2, (Apr. 4, 2016). 
 158.  See id. ¶¶ 184–203. 
 159.  Id. ¶ 204 (Venezuela points out that “Las Cristinas lies in the Imataca 
Reserve, which is a fragile rainforest with an extremely varied biodiversity and a 
significant [I]ndigenous population.”), ¶ 378 (Venezuela contended that because 
“the environmental and socio-cultural impact of the project proposed by Crystallex 
could not be mitigated[,]” “its authorization would have been a violation of the 
Venezuelan government’s obligation to ‘ensure protection of the environment and 
the population from situations that constitute imminent damages.’”). 
 160.  Id. ¶ 277. 
 161.  Id. ¶ 289. 
 162.  Id. ¶ 351. 
 163.  Id. ¶ 588. 
2018] Heritage, Power, and Destiny 130 
and biodiversity in general in the plot” and climate change.164  
While the Tribunal did not contest the state’s “right (and the 
responsibility) to raise concerns relating to global warming, 
environmental issues in respect of the Imataca Reserve, 
biodiversity, and other related issues,” it held that the 
specific way the state put forward such concerns in the 
permit denial letter “present[ed] significant elements of 
arbitrariness.”165 
Analogously, in Cosigo Resources v. Colombia, 166  the 
claimants contended that the creation of a national park in an 
area including their gold mining concession amounted to a 
wrongful expropriation of the latter. 167   Reportedly, “the 
prospect of extractive activity in the area sparked conflict 
among local Indigenous groups.”168  The claimants stated 
that although the state authorities granted the final legal 
approval of the project, 169  the creation of the Yaigojié 
Apaporis national park encompassing the area of the mining 
concession led to the suspension of all mining activities in 
the same. 170   The claimants also contended that the 
consultations with the Indigenous communities led by the 
government were insufficient and violated the standards set 
by International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 
(ILO Convention 169).171 
In its response, Colombia referred to its constitutional and 
international law obligations to protect biodiversity and 
Indigenous peoples’ rights (referring to both the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the ILO Convention 169).172  
                                                 
 164.  Id. ¶ 590. 
 165.  Id. ¶ 591. 
 166.  Cosigo Resources, Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, Notice of Demand 
and Demand for Arbitration and Statement of Claim, UNCITRAL (Feb. 19, 2016). 
 167.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 168.  Luke Eric Peterson & Zoe Williams, Two New Treaty-Based 
Disputes Center on Friction Between Colombian Mining and National Parks – 
and Highlight Differing Transparency Rules in Canada and US FTAs, INV. ARB. 
REP. 3 (Mar. 2016); see also Cosigo Resources, Notice of Demand, UNCITRAL, 
¶ 11 (noting, however, that the Association of Indigenous Communities of Taraira 
and Vaupés “would have a twenty percent ownership share in the mining 
concession.”). 
 169.  Cosigo Resources, Notice of Demand, UNCITRAL, ¶ 12. 
 170.  See Peterson & Williams, supra note 168, at 3–4. 
 171.  Cosigo Resources, Notice of Demand, UNCITRAL, ¶ 13. 
 172.  Id., Respuesta de la República de Colombia a la Solecitud de 
Arbitraje de las Demandantes, ¶¶ 8–9. 
2018] Heritage, Power, and Destiny 131 
The state highlighted that the Amazonian forest is one of the 
richest areas of the world in biological and cultural 
diversity173 and that the establishment of a natural park was 
intended to protect the natural and cultural values associated 
with the same.  As the case is still at a very early phase, it is 
not possible to foresee whether the case will be settled or how 
the Arbitral Tribunal will decide it. 
C.  Indigenous Protests and the Full Protection and 
Security Standard 
Foreign investors can file claims against a host state 
contending that it failed to protect their investments against 
actions of Indigenous peoples.  Customary law and most IIAs 
require full protection and security for foreign investors and 
their investments.174  This standard “requires, inter alia, that 
the host state use due diligence in protecting the investor 
against injuries from host state nationals and provide redress 
to the investor for any violations of its rights by its 
nationals.” 175   In some awards, arbitral tribunals have 
considered state response to social unrest to be in breach of 
the full protection and security standard.176 
For instance, in Burlington v. Ecuador, the claimant 
sought, inter alia, to hold Ecuador liable for failing to provide 
physical protection and security for the company’s 
hydrocarbon concession in blocks twenty-three and twenty-
four of the Amazonian rain forests. 177   Burlington 
complained that the opposition of Indigenous communities 
to oil development had impeded its business and that 
Ecuador’s purported failure to provide physical security 
violated the standard of full protection and security under the 
U.S.–Ecuador BIT.178  In its decision, the Arbitral Tribunal 
dismissed this specific claim on jurisdictional grounds, 
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stressing the importance of informing states of disputes so 
that they have the opportunity to remedy a possible breach 
and thereby avoid arbitration proceedings. 179   Because 
Burlington failed to give clear notice to Ecuador of its claims 
for denial of full protection and security, arbitrators ruled that 
the treaty’s mandatory six-month waiting period before 
arbitration can be initiated had not run.  As a result, the claim 
was declared inadmissible.180 
In Bear Creek v. Peru, 181  the claimant, a Canadian 
company contended that Peru had failed to afford its 
investment, the Santa Ana Silver mining project, the 
protection set out in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
between Canada and Peru.  In particular, it claimed that Peru 
unlawfully expropriated its investment and violated the fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security 
standards.182  The Santa Ana project lies in a border region183 
and under Peruvian law, “a foreign national can only gain 
rights to natural resources in border regions when the foreign 
national makes a case to the Peruvian Government for a 
public necessity.”184  The company “initiated the procedure 
to obtain the necessary mining rights.” 185   A subsequent 
decree declared that the Santa Ana project was “a public 
necessity” and authorized the claimant to acquire mining 
concessions.186 
However, the project lies in a region traditionally 
inhabited by the Aymara peoples, pre-Inca communities who 
have been in Peru for a long time.187  For the Aymara, “this 
land is not only a geographical” but also a spiritual space as 
it includes “the guardian mountains (Apus), which represent 
extremely important spiritual sanctuaries for all the 
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population in the area.”188  Some Indigenous communities 
protested against the project. 189   For the respondent, the 
project divided and caused resentment among the Indigenous 
communities because some of them “were to be involved in 
(and would benefit from) the Project, whereas others would 
not, with the consequence that those [who] received jobs 
were placated, and those who received nothing were 
angry.”190  Despite several workshops among the company’s 
representatives, state authorities, and local communities,191 
protests continued to take place against the mining project.192  
Protesters required the cancellation of all mining projects and 
the protection of Khapia Hill, a sacred place for the 
Aymaras. 193   After the protest became violent, 194  Peru 
revoked the finding of a public necessity, thereby annulling 
the legal condition for the claimant’s ownership of mineral 
concessions.195  
According to the Amici Curiae, the company “did not do 
what was necessary to understand the doubts, worries and 
anxieties and the Aymara culture and religiosity.”196  For the 
Amici, “the company acted as if it were sufficient to promise 
benefits to some of the . . . communities in the areas 
surrounding the project, to hold public meetings announcing 
their plans without needing to work closely with the 
communities.”197  Therefore, some communities opposed the 
project and the company “did not obtain the social license to 
develop its project,” that is, the approval of the population.198  
According to the Amici, the conflict started due to, inter alia, 
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“lack of respect for the peasant communities and respect for 
the rights of Indigenous peoples.”199  Further, according to 
the Amici’s brief, “the Aymara have a deep respect for 
mother earth (Pachamama), and it is their responsibility to 
protect her.” 200   The Aymara had “concerns regarding 
change to the natural landscape, the integrity of their 
territories, and the negative effects on their sanctuaries and 
culture.”201  They also feared that the open pit mine would 
affect the quantity of available water.202 This led to social 
protests.203   
In turn, the claimant contended that it engaged in 
“meaningful and extensive community relations 
programs”204 and that it obtained the communities’ support 
for the Santa Ana project and the “social license” to 
operate.205  The company also stressed that it was the state’s 
duty to consult with local communities before granting rights 
over their lands.206  For the claimant, Peru’s action amounted 
to an indirect expropriation because it permanently deprived 
the company of “its ability to own and operate its lawfully 
acquired mining concessions.”207  For the company, there 
was disproportion between such deprivation and “the stated 
goal of quelling political pressure and social protests.”208 
The Tribunal acknowledges the “strong political pressure” 
on Peru due to “social unrest.”209  It also questioned “whether 
Claimant took the appropriate and necessary steps to engage 
all of the relevant and likely to be affected local 
communities, and whether its approach contributed 
significantly to the nature and extent of the opposition that 
followed.”210  It then noted that “support for the Project came 
from communities that were receiving some form of benefits 
(i.e., jobs, direct payments for land use, etc.) and that those 
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communities that remained silent or objected were either not 
receiving benefits, were uninformed, or both.”211   
Yet, the Tribunal noted that: 
[T]he ILO Convention 169 imposes direct obligations only on 
States.  Contrary to Respondent’s arguments, private companies 
cannot “fail to comply” with ILO Convention 169 because it 
imposes no direct obligations on them.  The Convention adopts 
principles on how community consultations should be undertaken, 
but does not impose an obligation of result.  It does not grant 
communities veto power over a project.212 
The Tribunal concluded that the company “could take it 
for granted to have complied with all legal requirements with 
regard to its outreach to the local communities.”213  Instead, 
the Tribunal found that Peru’s conduct amounted to an 
indirect expropriation of the company’s investment.214  The 
Tribunal noted that “those members of the [I]ndigenous 
population that opposed the Santa Ana Project have achieved 
their wishes: the Project is well and truly at an end.  
However, this does not relieve Respondent from paying 
reasonable and appropriate damages for its breach of the 
FTA.”215   
In his partial dissenting opinion, appended to the final 
award, Arbitrator Professor Sands largely agreed with the 
conclusions of the Tribunal.  In his view, “the circumstances 
which the Peruvian government faced—massive and 
growing social unrest caused in part by the Santa Ana 
Project—left it with no option but to act in some way to 
protect the well-being of its citizens; however, other and less 
draconian options were available” to the government, which 
the respondent did not consider.216  Nonetheless, Arbitrator 
Professor Sands disagreed with the other members of the 
Arbitral Tribunal on how to assess damages.  He 
“conclude[d] that the assessment of damages should be 
reduced.” 217   For the Arbitrator, “the Project collapsed 
because of the investor’s inability to obtain a ‘social license,’ 
the necessary understanding between the Project’s 
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proponents and those living in the communities most likely 
to be affected by it.”218  As the Arbitrator pointed out, “the 
viability and success of a project such as this, located in the 
community of the Aymara peoples, a group of 
interconnected communities, was necessarily dependent on 
local support.”219  However, for the Arbitrator, the company 
“did not . . . take real or sufficient steps . . . to engage the 
trust of all potentially affected communities” and this 
“appears to have contributed, at least in part, to some of the 
population’s general discontent with the Santa Ana 
Project.”220  The Arbitrator concluded that “[t]he Canada-
Peru FTA is not, any more than ICSID, an insurance policy 
against the failure of an inadequately prepared investor to 
obtain such a license.”221 
Referring to the preamble of the ILO Convention 169, to 
which Peru is a party, Arbitrator Professor Sands highlighted 
that such preamble “recognizes ‘the aspirations of 
[Indigenous and tribal] peoples to exercise control over their 
own institutions, ways of life and economic development and 
to maintain and develop their identities, languages and 
religions, within the framework of the States in which they 
live.’” 222   For him, the preamble also highlights “the 
distinctive contributions of Indigenous and tribal peoples to 
the cultural diversity and social and ecological harmony of 
humankind and to international cooperation and 
understanding.”  For Arbitrator Professor Sands, “[t]his 
preambular language offers encouragement to any investor 
to take into account as fully as possible the aspirations of 
[I]ndigenous and tribal peoples.”223 
Although Article 15 of the ILO Convention 169 imposes 
the duty to consult Indigenous peoples on governments, 
rather than investors, “the fact that the Convention may not 
impose obligations directly on a private foreign investor as 
such does not, however, mean that it is without significance 
or legal effects for them.”224  Rather, the Arbitrator pointed 
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out that “human rights . . . ‘are complemented by an 
obligation on all parts, public and private parties, not to 
engage in activity aimed at destroying such rights.’”225  He 
further added that “[a]s an international investor the 
Claimant has legitimate interests and rights under 
international law; local communities of Indigenous and tribal 
peoples also have rights under international law, and these 
are not lesser rights.”226 
In South American Silver Limited (SAS) v. Bolivia, the 
Bermudan subsidiary of a Canadian company alleged that the 
host state unlawfully expropriated the ten mining 
concessions the company had near the village of Malku 
Khota in the Bolivian Province of Potosí.227  In addition, it 
alleged the breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard and the prohibition of unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures. 228   The company requested 
restitution in kind and damages or, alternatively, full 
compensation. 229   The company noted that “[t]he vast 
majority of local residents in and around the Malku Khota 
Mining Project are [I]ndigenous people, of the Aymara or 
Quechua ethnic groups,”230 and that it had tried to maintain 
ongoing dialogue with the communities “to educate them 
about, and integrate them into [the] project.”231  According 
to the company, tensions emerged because of the state’s 
encouragement of illegal mining. 232   The company 
contended that the Bolivian government “granted complete 
immunity to the opposition leaders and authors of violence 
against the [c]ompany,” and that it expropriated the 
company’s investment without compensation. 233   For the 
company, “the [g]overnment itself, and not the local 
communities, was the one pressing for the nationalization of 
                                                 
 225.  Id. (quoting Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/26, ¶ 1199 (Dec. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, Award]). 
 226.  Id. ¶ 36. 
 227.  See South American Silver Ltd. v. Bolivia, Claimant’s Statement of 
Claim and Memorial, PCA Case No. 2013-15, ¶¶ 8–9 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/801. 
 228.  See id. ¶¶ 147, 157. 
 229.  See id. ¶ 10. 
 230.  Id. ¶ 45 (emphasis in original). 
 231.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 232.  See id. ¶ 49. 
 233.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 85. 
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the Malku Khota Project” for economic reasons.234  For the 
claimant, the expropriation did not have a public purpose as 
it “bear[s] no logical or proportional relationship with the 
stated objective of pacifying the area . . . .”235  
In its counter-memorial,236 the respondent alleged that the 
claimant violated “human, social and collective rights of the 
Indigenous Communities that live in the area” and that such 
violations operate as a jurisdictional bar to admissibility.237  
For Bolivia, the reversion of the concessions to state 
ownership was justified by a public interest: the need to 
restore public order in the area and to protect the rights of the 
Indigenous communities.238   Bolivia highlighted that it is 
“the country with the highest percentage of [I]ndigenous 
population in Latin America,”239 and acknowledged “[t]he 
precolonial existence of Indigenous nations and peoples and 
[their] ancestral domain over the territories.” 240   It also 
maintained that the state “guarantees th[e] free determination 
[of Indigenous peoples] with the frame of the unity of the 
State” 241  and that such self-determination consists in the 
right of Indigenous peoples to “autonomy, self-government, 
[and] their culture . . . in accordance with [the] Constitution 
and the law.”242    
Bolivia noted that “several Indigenous Communities [live] 
in the area of the Project,” that they have inhabited since time 
immemorial before the Spanish colonization, and “shar[e] 
                                                 
 234.  Id. ¶¶ 96, 98. 
 235.  Id. ¶ 144. 
 236.  See generally South American Silver Ltd. v. Bolivia, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Counter-Memorial on the Merits (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/801 (detailing the host state’s 
defense on procedural and substantive grounds). 
 237.  Id. ¶ 4.  
 238.  Id. ¶¶ 6–7 (noting that “the protection of Indigenous Communities is 
an essential mandate of the State that prevails over the rights of the private 
companies.”). 
 239.  Id. ¶ 33 (noting that “62% of the Bolivian population identifie[s] 
themselves as [I]ndigenous.”). 
 240.  Id. ¶ 35 (citation omitted). 
    241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. (also noting, at ¶ 36, that the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal 
of Bolivia has further clarified that the state “not only acknowledges the 
Indigenous peoples as different cultures . . . but also as nations,” that is, “as 
historical communities with a determined home territory that shar[e] differentiated 
language and culture, and “with the political capability to define their destiny . . . 
within the . . . State.”) 
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territory, culture, history, languages and organizations or 
legal, political, social and economic institutions of their 
own.” 243   According to the Bolivian Constitution, such 
communities have, inter alia, “the right to land,” that is, “the 
exclusive use and exploitation of the renewable natural 
resources” and the right to the “prior and informed 
consultation and the participation in the benefits for the 
exploitation of the non-renewable natural resources that are 
located in their territory.” 244   Moreover, they have “the 
power to apply their own norms . . . and [to define] . . . their 
development in accordance with their cultural criteria and 
principles of harmonic coexistence with Mother Nature.”245  
Bolivia noted that Indigenous peoples consider Mallku 
Khota as “a sacred place”246 despite the fact that the hill has 
been exploited since the Spanish colonization, 247  and 
“consider themselves ancestral owners of the minerals of the 
Andean mountains.”248  Therefore, the state contended, “any 
mining activity in the area of Mallku Khota is a particularly 
sensitive matter from the social point of view.” 249   For 
Bolivia, opposition to the project came from “the 
neighboring Indigenous Communities of the Project that saw 
in it a violation to their ancestral beliefs and an impending 
risk to the environment on which their survival depended 
on.”250  Bolivia accused the company of fomenting division 
and violence among the Indigenous communities, interfering 
with their right to self-government, and disregarding the 
traditions of Indigenous communities.  For Bolivia, the 
government “did not have any other option but to declare the 
Reversion to re-establish the public order.”251 
With regard to the applicable law, the investor argued that 
international investment law requires arbitral tribunals to 
“apply the treaty itself, as lex specialis, supplemented by 
international law if necessary.”252  Bolivia expressly required 
                                                 
 243.  Id. ¶ 41. 
 244.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. ¶ 90. 
 247.  Id. ¶ 71. 
 248.  Id. ¶ 72. 
 249.  Id. ¶ 74. 
 250.  Id. ¶ 80. 
 251.  Id. ¶ 84. 
 252.  See South American Silver Ltd. v. Bolivia, Claimant’s Statement of 
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the tribunal “to interpret the Treaty in light of the sources of 
international and internal law that guarantee the protection of 
the rights of the Indigenous peoples.”253  In this regard, it 
referred to customary norms of treaty interpretation as 
restated by the VCLT, requiring, inter alia, adjudicators to 
take the context of a treaty into account, which includes, 
according to its Article 31(3)(c), “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.”254  
Moreover, Bolivia argued that “under international public 
law, the obligations concerning the fundamental rights of the 
Indigenous Communities prevail over the obligations 
concerning foreign investment protection.”255  In support of 
this argument, Bolivia relied on Indigenous Peoples of 
Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, in which the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights held that “applying bilateral 
commercial agreements does not justify breaching State 
obligations arising out of the American Convention.” 256  
Bolivia derived the “superior position or special status” of 
human rights in the international legal system from Article 
103 and Article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations 
(Charter).  The former states “the supremacy” of the 
obligations established in the Charter over any other 
obligation acquired by its members.  The latter includes the 
pledge of U.N. Members to take action for the achievement 
of several purposes including the respect of human rights.257  
Moreover, the latter argues that norms concerning the 
fundamental human rights of human beings are erga omnes 
obligations.258  According to Simma and Kill:  
[I]t is possible that norms relating to economic, social and cultural 
rights could also constitute rules applicable in the relations among 
States, even if there is no independent treaty obligation running 
between the States in question, and even if we assume that such 
                                                 
Claim and Memorial, ¶ 116. 
 253.  South American Silver Ltd. v. Bolivia, Objections to Jurisdiction, 
Admissibility and Counter-Memorial on the Merits, ¶ 192.  
 254. Id. ¶ 193, n.278 (referring to Campbell MacLachan, The Principle of 
Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 280 (2005) (noting that “[Article 31(3)(c)] has the status of a 
constitutional norm within the international legal system.”). 
 255.  Id. ¶ 202. 
 256.  Id. ¶ 203. 
 257.  See id. ¶ 205. 
 258.  Id. ¶ 206. 
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obligations are not owed erga omnes . . . . the fact that the Vienna 
Convention’s preamble proclaims the State Parties universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all may tip the scale towards a broader conception of 
applicability.259  
Bolivia also recalled various international law instruments 
protecting Indigenous rights, including the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 260  the UNDRIP, the ILO 
Convention 169,261 and the Inter-American Convention on 
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women. 262   It also referred to the U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises “as evidence of the 
international public order.”263 
In its “Reply to Respondent’s Counter-Memorial,”264 the 
claimant denied any allegation of unlawful conduct and 
restated that “[t]he Tribunal . . . must rely upon the Treaty as 
the primary source of applicable law.”265  It “does not dispute 
the basic notion that treaties should generally be construed in 
harmony with international law” 266  and that “a systemic 
interpretation of the Treaty is called for under international 
law.”267  
Yet, the company contended that “Bolivia has not 
satisfactorily established why the Tribunal should give 
primacy to the rights of Indigenous communities over the 
clear terms of the Treaty.”268  In fact, quoting Bruno Simma, 
                                                 
 259.  Id. (quoting Bruno Simma & Theodor Kill, Harmonizing Investment 
Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, 
in CHRISTINA BINDER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST 
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 260. See OAS, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123.   
 261.  International Labor Organization Convention Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted June 27, 1989, 
ILO Convention 169, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1382, 383. 
 262.  OAS, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534. 
 263.  South American Silver Ltd. v. Bolivia, Objections to Jurisdiction, 
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 264.  South American Silver Ltd. v. Bolivia, Claimant’s Reply to 
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 265.  Id. ¶ 238. 
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the company contended that Article 31(3)(c) “can only be 
employed as a means of harmonization qua interpretation, 
and not for the purpose of modification, of an existing 
treaty.”269  The company also pointed out that “[t]he phrase 
‘relevant rules of international law’ in Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention refers to the sources of law set forth in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
i.e., international conventions, customary international law, 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”270  
Therefore, it contests that the UNDRIP, the U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises can be considered 
“rules of international law” that may be taken into account in 
the interpretation of treaties.271  The company qualified these 
instruments as “non-binding, de lege ferenda instruments” 
that “lack the State practice and opinio juris elements that 
would transform them into embodiments of customary 
international law.” 272   With regard to the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the ILO Convention 169, and 
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, the 
claimant noted that the United Kingdom is not party to these 
treaties.273  Moreover, the company argued that “Bolivia has 
not established, let alone suggested, that [all the mentioned 
instruments] . . . constitute either customary international law 
or general principles of law.”274  For the claimant, “Bolivia 
seeks to use Indigenous peoples’ rights as a shield to justify 
their unlawful conduct.”275  The case has not been decided 
yet; it will be interesting to see how the Arbitral Tribunal will 
settle the dispute. 
D.  Indigenous Peoples as Amici Curiae 
Several arbitration rules and IIAs now authorize arbitral 
tribunals to allow third party submissions. 276   Groups of 
                                                 
 269.  Id. ¶ 245 (quoting Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A 
Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L COMP. LEGAL Q. 573, 584 (2011)). 
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Indigenous peoples who are not party to a given arbitration 
but have an interest in the outcome of the same can seek 
permission to intervene in the proceedings as friends of the 
court (amici curiae).  Amicus curiae submissions can assist 
arbitral tribunals in the determination of a factual or legal 
issue related to the arbitration, by bringing a perspective, 
particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of 
the disputing parties.  They can be useful when there is a 
public interest in the dispute.  At the same time, the arbitral 
tribunals must ensure that the participation of amici curiae 
does not disrupt the proceedings and that the submission of 
amici curiae’s briefs does not unduly burden either party.   
Indigenous peoples have increasingly participated in 
investment arbitrations through amici curiae.  For instance, 
in Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, 277  concerning the 
development of a silver mining project, the Tribunal granted 
the permission to submit an amicus curiae brief to DHUMA, 
a Peruvian private non-profit organization which promotes 
the human rights of the Aymara and Quechua Indigenous 
peoples, and a Peruvian lawyer with expertise in business 
and human rights. 278   The Tribunal considered that the 
combination of their expertise and “local knowledge of the 
facts m[ight] add a new perspective that differs from that of 
the Parties . . . irrespective of whether DHUMA speaks for 
the Aymara communities, or whether its interests may be 
synonymous with the communities’ interests.”279   
The Amici contributed to the factual and legal architecture 
of the case.  On the factual level, they “present[ed] the 
concerns of the population with regard to the social, cultural 
and environmental impact that would occur if the Santa Ana 
mining project were developed.”280  From the amicus curiae 
brief, it appears that the Santa Ana project was taking place 
in a land principally inhabited by the Aymara people, mainly 
                                                 
Rule 37, May 29, 2008, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/documents/icsiddocs/icsid%20convention%20engl
ish.pdf.  
 277.  Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Peru, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/21, ¶ 663 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 278.  Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Peru, Procedural Order No. 5 (July 21, 
2016). 
 279.  Id. ¶ 40. 
 280.  Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Peru, Brief for the Association of 
Human Rights and the Environment et al. as Amicus Curiae, at 2 (June 9, 2016). 
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involved in agriculture, small-scale fishing, and livestock 
farming. 281   The brief highlighted the “deep cultural and 
social ties” of the Aymara people “with their . . . land and 
natural resources” 282   as well as the cultural and 
environmental concerns of these communities. 283   At the 
legal level, the Amicus Curiae brief referred to human rights 
law and corporate social responsibility.284  In particular, they 
referred to “the right of Indigenous peoples to free and 
informed prior consultation, the responsibility of the 
company to respect human rights and conduct itself with due 
diligence with the aim of obtaining local consent and social 
license to operate.”285    
The assessment of the Amici’s contribution to the factual 
and legal architecture of the Bear Creek case varies.  For the 
respondent, the amicus curiae brief is “a critical portion of 
the record” to assess the claimant’s conduct.286  By contrast, 
for the claimant, “[t]he Amici’s account of the events is 
incomplete, unsupported by any credible, competent or even 
verifiable evidence . . . and therefore inaccurate.”  The 
claimant contended that “even if the Amici’s version of the 
events were accurate (it is not), it implicates the conduct of 
the Government of Peru, not Bear Creek, and in fact 
complements Claimant’s position in this arbitration 
regarding Respondent’s shortcomings.” 287   Despite these 
diverging assessments, the Tribunal considered the Amici’s 
submission in the final award.288 
Yet, arbitral tribunals can decline third parties’ 
submissions.  For instance, in Border Timbers Limited v. 
Republic of Zimbabwe, and Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic 
of Zimbabwe, 289  the claimants alleged unlawful 
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expropriation of their farms in Zimbabwe, compulsorily 
acquired by the government of Zimbabwe as part of its land 
reform program in the 2000s.  An NGO and four Indigenous 
communities requested for the permission to file a written 
submission as amicus curiae to the arbitral tribunals 290  
because the farms were allegedly located on the ancestral 
territories of Indigenous peoples. 291   The Indigenous 
communities submitted that “the outcome of the present 
arbitral proceedings w[ould] determine not only the future 
rights and obligations of the disputing parties with regard to 
these lands, but m[ight] also potentially impact the 
Indigenous communities’ collective and individual 
rights.”292  
The Tribunal rejected the petition. 293   The Tribunal 
acknowledged that the Indigenous tribes have “some interest 
in the land over which the Claimants assert full legal title,” 
and that “it may therefore well be that the determinations of 
the Arbitral Tribunal in these proceedings will have an 
impact on the interests of the Indigenous communities.”294  
Yet, it held that the “apparent lack of independence or 
neutrality of the petitioners [wa]s a sufficient ground for 
denying the application.”295  In fact, the Tribunal considered 
that by requiring that the amicus curiae briefs bring a 
perspective that is “different from that of the parties,” Article 
37(2)(a) of the ICSID Rules implied a requirement of 
independence from the same parties.296  
Moreover, the Tribunal noted that “neither Party has put 
the identity and/or treatment of Indigenous peoples . . . under 
international law . . . in issue in these proceedings.” 297  
Therefore, for the Tribunal, the proposed amicus curiae 
briefs would not address a matter within the scope of the 
dispute as required by Article 37(2)(b). 298   While the 
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proposed submission purported to focus on the rights of 
Indigenous peoples under international law, the ICSID 
dispute concerned measures adopted by Zimbabwe that, 
according to the claimants, infringed provisions of the 
applicable BITs.299  For the Tribunal, the former was not 
within the scope of the latter.  Finally, the Tribunal decided 
that ascertaining whether the local communities constituted 
Indigenous peoples under international law was outside the 
proper scope of the dispute.300  In conclusion, the Tribunal 
adopted “a conservative reading of the ICSID arbitration.”301   
Even if arbitral tribunals allow third party submissions, 
they are not obligated to consider their arguments.  For 
instance, in the Glamis Gold case, the Tribunal granted the 
Quechan Indian Nation leave to file a non-party 
submission.302  However, in reaching its decision, it did not 
refer to any of the arguments advanced by their brief.  
In conclusion, Indigenous peoples have sought to 
participate, and in certain cases have participated in, arbitral 
proceedings as amici curiae.  Amici curiae are not 
particularly controversial in investor–state arbitration as a 
number of arbitration rules provide for the admissibility of 
their submissions if certain basic conditions are met.  Amicus 
curiae briefs can illuminate the stance of historically 
marginalized communities and contribute to ensure that the 
rights of Indigenous peoples are respected in the 
implementation of IIAs.  They can contribute to the factual 
and legal architecture of a case.  However, they do not 
constitute an ideal participatory mechanism as arbitral 
tribunals are not required to accept such submissions; rather, 
they can accept them, provided that certain conditions are 
met, including but not limited to timeliness, brevity, and 
independence.  Moreover, even when arbitral tribunals 
decide to accept amicus curiae briefs, they may impose 
restrictive word limits and short timeframes to present 
arguments.  More importantly, by serving as amici curiae, 
Indigenous peoples do not become parties to the 
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proceedings; they have limited rights in the course of the 
same and cannot file annulment claims.  Finally, arbitral 
tribunals are not obligated to discuss arguments presented in 
amicus curiae briefs in their awards.   
IV.  CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
What is the relevance of these and similar arbitrations to 
international investment law and international law more 
generally?  In several investment treaty arbitrations, the 
arguments of investors are intertwined with Indigenous 
claims.  In general terms, these cases have a significance that 
extends beyond international investment law itself because 
of their potential impact on Indigenous rights.  They show 
that international investment law is not a self-contained 
regime; rather, it is part and parcel of international law and 
can contribute to the development of the same.   
From an investment law perspective, these cases show 
how arbitral tribunals have dealt with (or chosen not to deal 
with) arguments concerning Indigenous peoples’ rights.  
While arbitral tribunals have shown some level of deference 
to state regulatory measures aimed at protecting Indigenous 
cultural heritage, they have adopted a more cautious stance 
when Indigenous peoples themselves directly articulated 
arguments as claimants or as amici curiae.  If the right of 
Indigenous peoples to participate in the decisions that affect 
them is crucial to the protection of their cultural heritage,303 
investor–state arbitration constitutes an uneven playing field.  
Rarely have Indigenous peoples filed investor–state 
arbitration as investors.304   The FDI-impacted Indigenous 
peoples do not have direct access to arbitral tribunals; rather, 
the host state needs to espouse their arguments.305  While 
Indigenous peoples can, and have, presented amicus curiae 
briefs reflecting their interests, investment tribunals are not 
legally obligated to accept, let alone consider, such briefs—
rather, they have the ability to do so should they deem it 
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appropriate. 306   On other occasions, where Indigenous 
peoples respond to investor activities by protest, investors 
have alleged violations of the full protection and security 
standard.307 
From a human rights perspective, the interplay between 
international investment law and human rights law highlights 
“the power imbalance between two international legal 
regimes” 308  and makes the case for rethinking and/or 
strengthening the current regime protecting the rights of 
Indigenous peoples.  International investment law requires 
states to grant foreign investors fair and equitable treatment, 
full protection and security, and nondiscrimination in 
addition to prohibiting unlawful expropriation and other 
forms of state misconduct.309  Human rights law requires the 
protection of the rights of Indigenous peoples and the 
property rights of the investors.310  If there is no inherent 
tension between these different subfields of international law 
in theory, potential overlapping tensions often arise in 
practice.  
While the international investment regime is characterized 
by binding, efficient, and effective dispute settlement 
mechanisms, the human rights system is characterized by 
diverse mechanisms for assessing violations of human rights.  
There is no dedicated tribunal empowered to adjudicate 
violations of Indigenous rights.  Human rights mechanisms 
usually require the exhaustion of internal remedies, which is 
often time-consuming.311  Furthermore, certain areas such as 
South Asia lack regional systems capable of delivering 
binding judgments. 312   In addition, even where there are 
regional human rights courts, “human rights courts face 
difficulties securing compliance with their judgments.”313  In 
other words, “[I]ndigenous rights are the subject of much 
more variable enforcement” than investors’ rights.314   
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The power imbalance between the relative strength of the 
investment regime and the relative weakness of the human 
rights system intensifies “already-existing power imbalances 
between [I]ndigenous communities, states and investors.”315  
Respondent states can raise human rights issues “as a means 
of justifying [their] action” before arbitral tribunals.316  Yet, 
they rarely raise human rights arguments in investment 
arbitrations “to avoid the negative repercussions that could 
result from investors . . . deciding to invest in other states.”317  
Nonetheless, it may be persuasive to a tribunal for host states 
to assert human rights arguments on behalf of Indigenous 
communities.318  In fact, scholars argue that “arbitrators may 
be prone to the ‘David Effect’”—an inclination to favor the 
perceived weaker party.319  Investors can also raise human 
rights issues to reinforce their investment claims.  However, 
investors rarely raise human rights issues, and if they do, they 
refer to the rights they allegedly are entitled to, rather than 
those of the FDI-impacted population.  Certain treaties 
permit home states, the states that investors are from, to 
intervene in investment arbitrations to raise human rights 
issues.320  However, this rarely occurs.  Finally, amici curiae 
can also raise human rights issues.  However, arbitral 
tribunals have no duty to admit such submissions, or to 
consider these briefs in their awards.  To sum up, investor–
state arbitrations and human rights adjudication seem to 
speak two different languages even when they deal with 
similar issues.  The power imbalance between the two treaty 
regimes plays a key role in perpetuating the power imbalance 
between states, foreign investors, and Indigenous peoples.   
Certainly, the investment law obligations of the state 
towards foreign investors do not justify violations of its 
human rights obligations towards Indigenous peoples.  In the 
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Sawhoyamaxa case,321 the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights held Paraguay liable for violating various human 
rights of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous community under the 
American Convention on Human Rights.  These 
communities claimed that Paraguay had, inter alia, violated 
their right to property by failing to recognize their title to 
ancestral lands.322  For its part, Paraguay had attempted to 
justify its conduct contending that the lands in question 
belonged to German investors and were protected under the 
Germany–Paraguay BIT.323  According to the government, 
the BIT prohibited the expropriation of foreign investors’ 
lands.  
However, after noting the linkage between land rights and 
the culture of Indigenous peoples,324 the Court clarified that 
the investment law obligations of the state did not exempt the 
state from protecting and respecting the property rights of the 
Sawhoyamaxa.325  Rather, the Court noted that compliance 
with investment treaties should always be compatible with 
the human rights obligations of the state.326  Moreover, the 
Court pointed out that the relevant BIT does not prohibit 
expropriation; rather, it allows expropriation subject to 
several requirements including the existence of a public 
purpose and the payment of compensation.327  Therefore, the 
Court found a violation of Article 21 of the Convention328 
and ordered the government to return the land to the 
Sawhoyamaxa community.  
From a general international law perspective, the collision 
between international investment law and the norms of 
international law protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples 
                                                 
 321.  Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 248 
(Mar. 29, 2006). 
 322.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 323.  Id. ¶ 115(b). 
 324.  Id. ¶ 118 (noting that “[t]he culture of the members of Indigenous 
communities reflects a particular way of life, of being, seeing and acting in the 
world, the starting point of which is their close relation with their traditional lands 
and natural resources, not only because they are their main means of survival, but 
also because they form part of their worldview, of their religiousness, and 
consequently, of their cultural identity.”). 
 325.  Id. ¶ 140. 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Id. ¶ 144. 
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constitutes a paradigmatic example of the possible 
interaction between different treaty regimes.  The increased 
proliferation of treaties and specialization of different 
branches of international law make some overlapping among 
the latter unavoidable.  General treaty rules on hierarchy—
namely lex posterior derogat priori 329  and lex specialis 
derogat generali330—may not be entirely adequate to govern 
the interplay between treaty regimes because the given 
bodies of law do not exactly overlap; rather, they have 
different scopes, aims, and objectives. 331   Unless a norm 
constitutes jus cogens,332 it is difficult to foresee and govern 
the interaction of different legal regimes. 
Can investment treaty tribunals consider and/or apply 
other bodies of law in addition to international investment 
law?  Given their institutional mandate, which is to settle 
investment disputes, there is a risk that investment treaty 
tribunals water down or overlook noteworthy cultural 
aspects of a given case.  International adjudicators may be 
perceived as detached from Indigenous communities and 
their cultural concerns and may not have specific expertise 
in Indigenous human rights law.  Furthermore, due to the 
emergence of a jurisprudence constante in international 
investment law, there is a risk that tribunals do conform to 
these de facto precedents without necessarily considering 
analogous Indigenous cultural heritage-related cases 
adjudicated before other international courts and tribunals.  
This is not to say that consistency in decision-making is 
undesirable; obviously, it can enhance the coherence and 
predictability of the system contributing to its legitimacy.  
Yet, the selection of the relevant precedents matters as it can 
have an impact on the decision.  
                                                 
 329.  Vienna Convention, supra note 119, art. 30. 
 330.  The concept lex specialis derogat legi generali is “a generally 
accepted technique of interpretation and conflict resolution in international law.”  
It indicates that “whenever two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, 
priority should be given to the norm that is more specific.”  See Conclusions of the 
work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (adopted by 
the International Law Commission at its Fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering 
the work of that session (A/61/10, ¶ 251), 408).  
 331.  Donald McRae, International Economic Law and Public 
International Law: The Past and the Future, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 627, 635 (2014).  
 332.  For discussion see Vadi, When Cultures Collide, supra note 6, at 857. 
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V.  POLICY OPTIONS 
The previous Part critically assessed the interplay between 
international investment law and human rights law 
protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples.  It highlighted 
the power imbalance between the two systems, which 
perpetuates the power imbalance among states, investors, 
and Indigenous peoples.  Against this background, this Part 
now examines two avenues that can facilitate the 
consideration of local communities’ entitlements in 
international investment law:  (i) a “treaty-driven approach” 
and (ii) a “judicially driven approach.”333  
A.  A Treaty-driven Approach to Promote the 
Consideration of Indigenous Rights in International 
Investment Law 
A treaty-driven approach suggests reform to bring 
international investment law better in line with human 
rights.334  It promotes the consideration of Indigenous rights 
in international investment law relying on the periodical 
renegotiation of IIAs.  Treaty drafters can expressly 
accommodate Indigenous peoples’ entitlements in the text of 
future IIAs or when renegotiating existing ones. 335   For 
instance, Indigenous communities’ interests can be 
mentioned in the preambles, exceptions, carve-outs, 
annexes, and provisions of IIAs.336  Such provisions would 
empower states to adopt measures to protect Indigenous 
peoples’ rights.  For instance, IIAs might require foreign 
investors to comply with existing human rights law as a 
condition for claiming rights under the treaty.337 
                                                 
 333.  Mihail Krepchev, The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land 
Rights in International Investment Law, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 42, 45 
(2015). 
 334.  Stephan W. Schill & Vladislav Djanic, Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, 
International Investment Law and Community Interests, Working Paper No. 
2016/01, at 4 (2016). 
 335.  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 6, at 277–86; Krepchev, 
supra note 333, at 45. 
 336.  Schill & Djanic, supra note 334, at 15. 
 337.  The Double Life of International Law, supra note 4, at 1773–74 
(adding that “in this manner, the mechanism that gives international investment 
law so much power—dispute settlement—is infused with the need to respect 
international Indigenous rights”); Foster, Investors, States and Stakeholders, supra 
note 5, at 407 (“Given the near-universal endorsement of UNDRIP by the 
international community, investors could not legitimately claim surprise or 
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The duty to protect the legitimate exercise of Indigenous 
peoples’ cultural rights has led a number of states to include 
specific Indigenous exceptions in international 
environmental law instruments banning the hunt of protected 
species.  “Aboriginal exemptions” commonly feature in a 
number of international environmental treaties, which 
include derogations to their main principles to accommodate 
the needs of Indigenous peoples.338  For instance, the 1946 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
retains aboriginal rights to subsistence whaling. 339   Such 
special measures and forms of differential treatment to 
protect the rights of Indigenous peoples are justified under 
human rights law.  Therefore, there is no theoretical obstacle 
to prevent the insertion of similar aboriginal exemptions in 
the context of IIAs. 
IIAs might require compliance with the requirements of 
free, prior, and informed consent and benefit-sharing for 
investments taking place in Indigenous lands. 340   Under 
human rights law, the duty of the state to obtain the free, 
prior, and informed consent of the Indigenous peoples before 
approving any project affecting them requires governments 
to engage in a meaningful dialogue and consensus-building 
process with Indigenous communities.  Nonetheless, nothing 
                                                 
prejudice if an investment treaty conferring benefits on them also memorialized 
an obligation on their part to respect the Indigenous rights enshrined in that 
instrument, or at least those applicable to the private sector.”). 
 338.  See, e.g., Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species, art. 3.5, 
June, 23 1979, 19 I.L.M. 11; Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific 
Fur Seals, art. 7, Feb. 9, 1957, 314 U.N.T.S. 105 (describing the aboriginal hunting 
practices that are exempted by the application of the Convention). 
 339.  International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. 
III(13)(b), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (permitting the taking of 
various baleen whales by Aborigines, but stipulating that “the meat and products 
of such whales are to be used exclusively for local consumption by the 
Aborigines”). 
 340.  On benefit sharing, see Elisa Morgera, The Need for an International 
Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing, EUR. J. INT’L L. 27, 353 
(2016) (noting that “a growing number of international legal materials refer to 
‘benefit sharing’ with regard to natural resource use” and that “benefit sharing 
applies to relations between communities and private companies that may be 
protected by international investment law”).  On the linkage between FPIC and 
benefit sharing, see Morgera, The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair 
and Equitable Benefit Sharing, 376 (noting that “much remains to be clarified 
about the interaction between benefit sharing and FPIC. On the one hand, benefit 
sharing may serve as a condition for the granting of FPIC . . . . On the other hand, 
benefit sharing may represent the end result of an FPIC process”). 
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precludes states from requiring investors to consider the 
existence of protected groups when assessing the economic 
risks of a given investment341 and obtain a social license to 
operate.  While some scholars have suggested incorporating 
local communities as a part of multi-actor contracts,342 other 
scholars have cautioned that “extractive industries can tackle 
the underlying causes of the growing opposition to their 
projects . . . by engaging in consent processes with 
[Indigenous] communities . . . with a view to obtaining their 
free, prior, and informed consent.”343  
In this regard, “[t]here is a growing trend of seeing 
business enterprises . . . as having human rights obligations 
in their own rights, separate and apart from state 
obligations.”344  According to the Ruggie’s Framework for 
Business and Human Rights345 that is now embedded in the 
U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, a 
company is “responsible for respecting all human rights” and 
“ha[s] the obligation to obtain consent of the local population 
to its operation in order to ensure its own sustainability.”346  
In other words, “for a social license to exist, there must be 
consent.” 347   As the Bear Creek Tribunal put it, “[e]ven 
though the concept of ‘social license’ is not clearly defined 
in international law, all relevant international instruments are 
clear that consultations with Indigenous communities are to 
be made with the purpose of obtaining consent from all the 
relevant communities.”348 
What does free, prior, and informed consent mean?  The 
term free indicates that Indigenous peoples must be free from 
                                                 
 341.  Krepchev, supra note 333, at 71.  
 342.  Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local 
Communities: Analysis of a Multi-Actor Investment Contract Framework, 15 
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 473 (2014). 
 343.  Lisa J. Laplante & Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The 
Case for Community Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 69 (2008). 
 344.  Sarah Sargent, What’s in a Name? The Contested Meaning of Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent in International Financial Law and Indigenous 
Rights, in VALENTINA VADI & BRUNO DE WITTE, CULTURE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 87–103 (Routledge 2015). 
 345.  John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 346.  Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Peru, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/21, ¶ 227 (Nov. 30, 2017) (internal reference omitted). 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. ¶ 406. 
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violence, intimidation, or harassment by the government or 
company.  The term prior indicates that the government (and 
ideally companies) must seek approval from Indigenous 
communities before commencing any economic activity in 
their lands.  The term informed signifies that the Indigenous 
community must receive all the information needed to make 
informed decisions in a language they can understand.  As 
noted by Myrna Cunnigham, the chair of the U.N. Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, “[l]ack of free, prior, and 
informed consent can have far reaching consequences on 
th[e] lives and human rights [of Indigenous peoples].”  In 
particular, free, prior, and informed consent can be a tool to 
safeguard Indigenous peoples’ “rights over ancestral lands . 
. . their ability to carry out subsistence activities, and their 
ability to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development in accordance with their right to self-
determination.”349  
Free, prior, and informed consent is a crucial legal tool for 
restoring an appropriate balance of power among states, 
investors, and Indigenous peoples.  On the one hand, it 
enables Indigenous peoples to decide for themselves whether 
a given project is suitable to their own needs and aspirations 
or whether they prefer not to proceed.  It enables them to 
shape their future and select the development model they 
prefer.  It also “may provide Indigenous communities with a 
better ability to shape and derive benefits from projects on 
traditional lands.”350  On the other hand, through free, prior, 
and informed consent, investors can assess the viability of 
the intended investment.  The support of local communities 
contributes to the viability of a project and even constitutes 
a necessary condition for its success in the long term.  In turn, 
projects that local Indigenous communities veto should not 
proceed.  The respect of free, prior, and informed consent by 
transnational corporations may provide them with 
“competitive advantage in a number of areas, such as 
preference in gaining government contracts, expedited 
developmental approvals and lower risks of litigation in the 
                                                 
 349.  Interview with Myrna Cunningham, supra note 60, at 55. 
 350.  Risa Schwartz, Realizing Indigenous Rights in International 
Environmental Law: A Canadian Perspective, CIGI Papers No. 109/2016, at 5. 
(2016) 
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future.” 351   Finally, through free, prior, and informed 
consent, states can better implement their human rights 
obligations towards Indigenous peoples and acknowledge 
their parallel sovereignty (i.e., an Indigenous sovereignty 
that coexists with that of the state).352   
Free, prior, and informed consent is a legal tool that 
bridges the gap between international investment law and 
human rights law and can contribute to the harmonious 
development of public international law.  It is a crucial tool 
of self-determination: preventing the imposition of values, 
fashions, and economic models that may undermine the 
cultural identity, human rights, and core values of Indigenous 
peoples.  If the U.N. practice concerning self-determination 
used to be restrictive, exclusively concerning the 
decolonization process and the emergence of new states, 
since the inception of the UNDRIP the concept of self-
determination has expanded to include the self-
determination of nations within given states.353  This new 
understanding of self-determination is consistent with the 
doctrine of the parallel sovereignty of Indigenous peoples 
within states.  In fact, some recognize that “the existence of 
a given degree of [I]ndigenous sovereignty [is] parallel to the 
sovereign power held by the State.”354  The concept of self-
determination also distinguishes ILO Convention 169, the 
most recent ILO instrument concerning Indigenous peoples, 
from its predecessor ILO Convention 107 (no longer open 
for signing). 355   ILO Convention 107 was “the first 
international convention on the subject” and it “contained a 
fundamental flaw” as “it promote[d] eventual integration of 
. . . [I]ndigenous [persons] into the society at large rather than 
                                                 
 351.  Alexandra S. Wawryk, Minimizing the Environmental and Cultural 
Impacts of Oil Operations in Emerging Economies: Transnational Oil Companies 
and Voluntary International Environmental Standards, in BARBARA T. HOFFMAN, 
ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE—LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 278 (CUP 2006). 
 352.  Lenzerini, supra note 29, at 156 (“asserting the existence of a given 
degree of Indigenous sovereignty parallel to the sovereign power held by the 
state.”). 
 353.  Id. at 160–61.  
 354.  Id. at 156. 
 355.  International Labor Organization, Convention Concerning the 
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries, ILO Convention No. 107, June 26, 1957, 
328 U.N.T.S. 247. 
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promoting their right to self-determination.” 356   ILO 
Convention 169 overcomes this flaw, assuming that 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own 
development.357    
Free, prior, and informed consent prominently features in 
the UNDRIP, being mentioned six times.358  Although the 
instrument is not legally binding, arguably its provisions can 
be considered as coalescing rules of customary law because 
a substantial number of states have adhered to it.359  Article 
15 of the ILO Convention 169 has a more conservative 
wording, providing that Indigenous peoples have “the right . 
. . to participate in the use, management and conservation” 
of the natural resources pertaining to their lands.  In cases in 
which the state retains the ownership of resources:   
[G]overnments shall establish or maintain procedures through 
which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining 
whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, 
before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the 
exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their 
lands.  The peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate 
in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair 
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result 
of such activities.360  
Although “ambiguities persist over whether [I]ndigenous 
land rights encompass a right to veto decisions regarding 
development projects which are likely to affect [I]ndigenous 
traditional lands and resources,”361 human rights courts have 
held that informed consent is required for large-scale 
development projects that would have a major impact on 
Indigenous land.362  Therefore, for some scholars, the right 
of Indigenous peoples to free, prior, and informed consent 
does not merely have a procedural nature; rather, it has a 
                                                 
 356.  Campbell, supra note 135, at 563. 
 357.  Id. 
 358.  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 2, arts. 
32, 10 (stating that “no relocation shall take place without free, prior and informed 
consent”), arts. 11, 19 (stating that “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith 
. . . in order to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent”), arts. 28, 29. 
 359.  JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 79 (2009). 
 360.  ILO Convention 169, supra note 42, art. 15 (emphasis added). 
 361.  Gaetano Pentassuglia, Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of 
Indigenous Land Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 165, 169 (2011). 
 362.  See, e.g., Saramaka Peoples v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C), No. 172, ¶ 134 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
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substantive gate-keeping function by “enabl[ing] Indigenous 
peoples to protect their substantive land rights . . . and 
culture.”363  The right to free, prior, and informed consent 
can enable Indigenous peoples to exercise the right to self-
determination and determine the model of development they 
prefer in conformity with their worldview.364  
A number of IIAs include clauses expressly 
acknowledging the rights of Indigenous peoples.  For 
instance, New Zealand has included an exception in its IIAs 
that recognizes the state’s right to protect the Maori under 
the Treaty of Waitangi and exempts such measures from the 
scrutiny of arbitral tribunals.365   Analogously, the Energy 
Charter Treaty 366  allows the contracting parties to adopt 
“measures designed to benefit investors who are aboriginal 
people.” 367   Canada’s new model Foreign Investment 
Protection Agreement (FIPA) also includes preferential 
treatment for aboriginals in its annex. 368  Malaysia has 
similarly excluded measures designed to promote economic 
empowerment of the Bumiputras ethnic group from the 
scope of its BITs.369  
The participation of Indigenous representatives in the 
drafting and renegotiation of IIAs has been recently 
recommended by the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
Indigenous peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuzqa. 370   After 
finding that nondiscrimination and expropriation provisions 
in IIAs have “significant potential to undermine the 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ land rights and the 
strongly associated cultural rights,” 371  she recommended 
states to develop participatory mechanisms so that 
Indigenous peoples have the ability to comment and provide 
                                                 
 363.  Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate 
Natural Resource Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-based 
Development, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 785, 828 (2012). 
 364.  See Sargent, supra note 344, at 95. 
 365.  See VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 6, at 279. 
 366.  Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95. 
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inputs in the negotiation of IIAs.   
Yet, the practice remains relatively scarce.  Most of the 
existing IIAs do not contain any explicit reference to 
Indigenous interests.372  Moreover, IIAs generally include 
“survival clauses that guarantee protection under the treaty . 
. . for a substantial period after the treaty has elapsed.”373  
Therefore, “it is unrealistic to expect that treaty drafting can 
solve the conflict between [international investment law] and 
other community interests on its own.” 374   While treaty-
drafting can “stabilize relations” between investors, states, 
and Indigenous peoples,375 it seems crucial to consider other 
mechanisms to promote the consideration of Indigenous 
rights in international investment law and arbitration.376 
B. A Judicially-driven Approach to Promote the 
Consideration of Indigenous Rights in International 
Investment Law 
A judicially driven approach suggests that international 
investment law and arbitration already possess the tools to 
address the interplay between investors’ rights and 
community interests. 377   Such an approach promotes the 
consideration of Indigenous rights in international 
investment arbitration relying on the interpretation and 
application of international investment law by arbitral 
tribunals.  Its implicit assumption is that “[w]hile 
[international investment law] is a highly specialized system, 
it is not a self-contained one, but forms part of the general 
                                                 
 372.  Pushkar Anand & Amit Kumar Sinha, Protecting the Rights of 
Tribals, THE HINDU (Feb. 22 2017), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-
ed/protecting-the-rights-of-tribals/article17372134.ece (noting that “none of the 
80-plus BITs signed by India contains . . . [a] provision on the rights [of 
Indigenous peoples].  Even the 2015 Model Indian agreement does not contain any 
such provision”). 
 373.  See Schill & Djanic, supra note 334, at 16. 
 374.  Id. 
 375.  See Foster, Investors, States and Stakeholders, supra note 5, at 420; 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Rebalancing Through Exceptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 449, 451 (2013) (noting that “countries already are engaged in rebalancing 
through treaty exceptions” but also aptly highlighting, at 459, that “if the . . . 
provisions of the BITs are interpreted as they should be interpreted, there is very 
little in them that would impede legitimate measures to protect the environment 
[and community interests]”). 
 376.  See Schill & Djanic, supra note 334, at 16. 
 377.  Id. at 4. 
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system of international law.”378 
Arbitral tribunals are of limited jurisdiction and cannot 
adjudicate on the eventual infringement of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights.  Arbitral tribunals lack the jurisdiction to 
hold states liable for breach of their human rights obligations.  
Rather, they can only determine if the protections in the 
relevant investment treaty have been breached.  
However, this does not mean that Indigenous rights are 
and/or should be irrelevant in the context of investment 
disputes.  IIAs are international treaties; they belong to 
international law.  Therefore, arbitral tribunals can and 
should interpret international investment law in conformity 
with international law.379  Because international investment 
law constitutes an important field of international law, it 
should not frustrate the aim and objectives of the latter.  
Several international law instruments recognize and protect 
the human rights of Indigenous peoples, including the 
UNDRIP, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),380 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),381 the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),382 and ILO Convention 169.383  
Arbitral tribunals should interpret international investment 
law by taking into account “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.”384  In fact, according to customary rules of treaty 
interpretation as restated by the VCLT, when interpreting a 
treaty, arbitrators can take other international obligations of 
the parties into account.385  As the Urbaser Tribunal put it, 
                                                 
 378.  Id. at 16. 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 
17, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
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 381.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
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 385.  Id. For commentary, see generally McLachlan, Investment Treaties 
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IIAs “ha[ve] to be construed in harmony with other rules of 
international law of which it forms part, including those 
relating to human rights.”386 
International law provisions protecting Indigenous 
peoples’ rights include both hard law and soft law. 387  
Examples of binding cultural entitlements abound.  For 
instance, Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
recognize the right of self-determination in referring to the 
peoples’ right to “freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.” 388   The same provision also clarifies that 
international economic cooperation is “based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit[] and international law” and that 
“in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.” 389   Significantly, the principle of self-
determination is commonly regarded as a jus cogens rule.390  
Other norms protecting Indigenous rights with jus cogens 
status 391  include the prohibitions of discrimination and 
                                                 
OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 55–61 (Brill 2014). 
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582 (7th ed. 2008); JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-
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DETERMINATION 289 n.254 (Martinus Nijhoff ed. 2002).  But see Matthew Saul, 
The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A Formula for 
Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?, HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11 609, 
610 (2011) (noting that “international lawyers continue to be troubled by the 
question of whether or not any aspect of the legal norm has jus cogens status”); 
Daniel Thürer & Thomas Burri, Self-Determination, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., ¶ 45 (arguing that the “function of the principle 
of self-determination to maintain and promote stability and justice in international 
relations. It seems more productive to conceive self-determination in such a broad 
and functional fashion, than to lay much emphasis on neuralgic points, such as its 
possible dogmatic qualification as a peremptory norm of international law”). 
 391.  Vienna Convention, supra note 119, art. 53 (recognizing a jus cogens 
norm as one “accepted and recognized by the international community of states as 
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genocide. 
There are more instances of nonbinding cultural 
entitlements.  For instance, Indigenous culture plays a central 
role in the UNDRIP.  Although the UNDRIP is not binding 
per se, it can coalesce customary international law and 
therefore become binding.  Some of its contents already 
express customary international law or repeat provisions 
appearing in (binding) treaty law.392  
Over the past twenty years, “there has been a robust 
development of jurisprudence regarding the land and 
resource rights of Indigenous peoples under international 
law.” 393   Such jurisprudence “generally emphasizes the 
unique and enduring cultural relationship of peoples to their 
territory.”394  “[F]or Indigenous peoples, the ability to reside 
communally on their lands . . . is inextricably tied to the 
preservation of communal identity, culture, religion and 
traditional modes of subsistence.”395    
In conclusion, international investment law does not pay 
too much attention to culture, at least when it comes to the 
current texts of IIAs.  International arbitral tribunals have no 
specific mandate (or a limited mandate at best) to protect 
Indigenous peoples’ rights.  Nonetheless, interpretation in 
conformity with general international law is required by the 
principle of systemic integration as restated in Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT.  Therefore, human rights law and 
general international law can influence the interpretation and 
application of international investment law.  This argument 
is even stronger with regard to cultural entitlements that are 
binding or have a peremptory character.  Because arbitral 
tribunals often seem reticent when referring to, let alone 
considering, such rights, increased efforts by all actors 
involved—treaty negotiators, arbitrators, academics, and 
                                                 
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is possible”).  On jus cogens and 
international investment law, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules of Law 
and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 175–203 (2007); 
Valentina Vadi, Jus Cogens in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 46 
NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 357–388 (2015). 
 392.  On the effectiveness of soft law in international investment law, see 
e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, Assessing the Effectiveness of Soft Law Instruments in 
International Investment Law, in ANDREA K. BJORKLUND & AUGUST REINISCH, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW  51–81 (2012). 
 393.  Aponte Miranda, supra note 363, at 813. 
 394.  Id. at 825. 
 395.  Id. at 814. 
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Indigenous peoples—are needed to foster such 
consideration. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The effective protection of Indigenous cultural heritage is 
crucial for the effective protection of the rights of Indigenous 
peoples.  Cultural heritage is “something that is left behind, 
to be discovered and rediscovered over and over again, that 
is filled with meanings conveying values in the present as 
well as for future generations.” 396   The UNDRIP has 
emphasized the importance of Indigenous peoples’ cultural 
entitlements and highlighted the linkage between the 
protection of their cultural identity and their human rights.397  
Although the Declaration is not binding per se, it may be or 
become so, insofar as it reflects customary international law, 
general principles of law, and/or jus cogens.  At the very 
least, the UNDRIP constitutes a standard that states should 
strive to achieve.  
The interplay between FDI on the one hand, and 
Indigenous cultural heritage on the other, in international 
investment law is coming to the forefront of legal debate.  
The arbitrations analyzed in this Article provide a snapshot 
of the clash of cultures between international investment law 
and human rights law requiring the protection of Indigenous 
heritage.  These arbitrations also highlight a fundamental 
power imbalance between the two regimes that perpetuates a 
historical power imbalance among states, investors, and 
Indigenous communities.  Because of the power imbalance 
between the two regimes, states tend to favor transnational 
business interests over Indigenous peoples’ fundamental 
rights.  This favoritism further exacerbates the power 
imbalance between multinational corporations and 
Indigenous peoples. 
Investment disputes concerning Indigenous cultural 
heritage often involve the conflict between rights of the 
investors and the rights of Indigenous peoples under different 
branches of international law.  Therefore, arbitral tribunals 
                                                 
 396.  See Josefsson & Aronsson, supra note 55, 2098. 
 397.  See Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, Treaties, Peoplehood, and Self-
Determination: Understanding the Language of Indigenous Rights, in ELVIRA 
PULITANO, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION 64, 67 
(CUP 2012). 
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may not be the most suitable fora to settle this kind of 
dispute.  They may face difficulties in finding an appropriate 
balance between the different interests concerned.  They are 
courts of limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate on state 
violations of Indigenous peoples’ entitlements. 
This does not mean, however, that arbitrators should not 
take Indigenous entitlements into account.  This Article 
identified two main avenues for considering Indigenous 
peoples’ concerns in the context of investment treaty 
arbitration.  First, de lege lata, according to Article 31(3)(c) 
of the VCLT, arbitrators can interpret international 
investment law by taking into account other international law 
commitments of the state.  Moreover, arbitral tribunals 
should be sympathetic to amicus curiae briefs presented by 
Indigenous tribes, accepting them as a matter of course in 
disputes that can affect their interests.  This would enable 
Indigenous communities to have a say in proceedings that 
can affect them, even though participation as amici curiae 
does not amount to a right.  
Second, de lege ferenda, states can negotiate future IIAs 
and renegotiate existing ones to facilitate the consideration 
of community interests in investor–state arbitration.  This 
process is already under way, as states have inserted 
references to important values in treaty preambles, 
exceptions, carve outs, and annexes.  Of particular 
importance would be the requirements of free, prior, and 
informed consent and benefit-sharing.  Such provisions 
protect paramount interests and facilitate tribunals’ duty to 
consider international law when interpreting and applying 
international investment provisions.    
In conclusion, this Article does not exclude the potential 
for FDI to represent a positive force for development.  It 
highlights that international investment arbitration has 
started to address the power imbalance between foreign 
investors and host states.  At the same time, however, this 
vital field of international law risks maximizing and/or 
perpetuating power asymmetries among states, investors, 
and Indigenous peoples.  Therefore, the Article proposes two 
avenues for creating a balance of power that enables the 
protection of FDI and ensures the protection of Indigenous 
cultural heritage.  Only by interpreting international 
investment law in conformity with international law and/or 
fine-tuning its language can international investment law 
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develop its potential to enable peaceful and prosperous 
relations among nations and contribute to the development 
of international law.  
 
 
